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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Overview
On April 19, 1994, the United States Supreme Court decided
* Associate at the law firm of Ivester, Skinner & Camp, P.A., Little Rock,
Arkansas; M.B.A., 1987 University of Arkansas; J.D., 1992, University of Arkansas
at Little Rock. I would like to thank Mrs. Pat Lieggi for her help preparing this
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a draft of the article.
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Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank.' In Central Bank, Justice
Kennedy, writing for a 5-4 majority, 2 overturned established case
law in the jurisdictions of all eleven United States circuit courts of
appeals and ruled that private civil liability under section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 ("Exchange Act") does not
extend to those "who do not engage in the manipulative or deceptive
practice but who [only] aid and abet the violation. ' 4 The Court
based its decision on the express text of the statute, declaring that
"[tihe issue ... is not whether imposing private civil liability on
aiders and abettors is good policy but whether aiding and abetting
is covered by the statute." 5
The Court's decision in Central Bank places all theories of
secondary liability under the Exchange Act in jeopardy, and some
authorities argue the decision is likely to slant the playing field in
the securities litigation arena sharply in favor of those professionals
who have traditionally been its targets, at the expense of defrauded
investors. 6 However, the lower federal courts have historically tempered
1. 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
2. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined. Justice Stevens filed
a dissenting opinion in which he was joined by Justices Blackmun, Souter, and
Ginsburg. 114 S. Ct. at 1455 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It appears that Justice Kennedy
holds the swing vote in interpreting whether specific implied causes of action under
the federal securities laws exist and in the determination of the methodology employed
by the Court. Justice Kennedy seemingly switched to the more restrictive methodolgy
in Central Bank as compared to the position he took in Virginia Bankshares, Inc.
v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991), where he wrote in his concurring and dissenting
opinion, "If the analysis adopted by the Court today is any guide, Congress and
those charged with enforcement of the securities laws stand forewarned that unresolved
questions concerning the scope of those causes of action are likely to be answered
by the Court in favor of defendants." Id. at 1115 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
4. 114 S. Ct. at 1443.
5. Id. at 1448.
6. See Testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, United States Securities and
Exchange Commission concerning the Central Bank decision, before the Subcommittee
on Securities, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States
Senate (hereinafter Subcommittee), May 12, 1994 (hereinafter Levitt Testimony);
Testimony of United States Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum, Ohio, before the
Subcommittee, May 12, 1994 (hereinafter Metzenbaum Testimony); Testimony of
Mark J. Griffin, Director, Division of Securities, Utah Department of Commerce,
on behalf of the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA),
before the Subcommittee, May 12, 1994 (hereinafter NASAA Testimony); Testimony
of Christopher J. Dodd, Connecticut, Chairman, Subcommittee, May 12, 1994 (here-
inafter Dodd Testimony); Testimony of David S. Ruder, Professor of Law, North-
western University School of Law, before the Subcommittee, May 12, 1994 (hereinafter
Ruder Testimony); Testimony of Harvey J. Goldschmid, Professor of Law, Columbia
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the harshness of the Supreme Court's strict statutory approach by
adopting alternative theories of recovery. 7 This antithetic relationship
between the courts has created an ebb and flow of section 10(b)
jurisprudence, both expanding and restricting the scope of liability
under the provision! s In the wake of Central Bank, the lower federal
courts are likely to modify the restrictive effect of the Court's decision
by expanding primary liability under the term "indirectly" contained
within the text of section 10(b). Whether this expansion can broaden
the scope of liability to pre-Central Bank boundaries is yet to be
seen. 9
This article briefly summarizes the requirements for sustaining
an action under section 10(b) and analyzes the Supreme Court's
decision in Central Bank. In the analysis, it discusses the appropriate
standard of culpability, the effect of the opinion on SEC enforcement
actions, and the various aspects of secondary liability under the
Exchange Act, including the definition, historical development, and
status of the doctrines of aider and abettor liability, conspiracy,
controlling person liability, and liability under common law agency
principles. Also, the article analyzes the concept of "indirect" liability
under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and discusses the scope of
conduct covered by such liability. Finally, the article includes an
analysis of the possibility of congressional response to the Court's
decision in Central Bank.
B. The Rule lOb-5 Claim
Section 10(b) is the general anti-fraud provision in the Exchange
Act. 10 It states:
University School of Law, before the Subcommittee, May 12, 1994 (hereinafter Gold-
schmid Testimony); Testimony of Donald C. Langevoort, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt
University, before the Subcommittee, May 12, 1994 (hereinafter Langevoort Testi-
mony). But see Testimony of Eugene I. Goldman, Partner in the Washington, D.C.
office of McDermott, Will & Emery, before the Subcommittee, May 12, 1994 (here-
inafter Goldman Testimony); Testimony of Stuart J. Kaswell, Senior Vice President
and General Counsel, Securities Industry Association ("SIA"), before the Subcom-
mittee, May 12, 1994 (hereinafter SIA Testimony).
7. See Langevoort Testimony, supra note 6, at 1-2.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 3. Restricting the scope of liability under Rule lOb-5 will most likely
have little effect on the volume of actions filed. As of June 1993, the number of
securities fraud class actions had tripled since 1988. Furthermore, the number of
suits filed in 1990 alone was virtually equivalent to the number of suits filed in 1987,
1988, and 1989 combined. See Testimony of William R. McLucus, Director, Division
of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission, before the Subcommittee,
June 17, 1993.
10. Section 10(b) is an omnibus provision drafted to parallel the language in 15
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It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange ....
(b) [to] use or employ, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange
or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe ....
Subsequent to the Exchange Act's passage the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") promulgated Rule lOb-5 I1 which
parallels the statutory proscription. It states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1988), otherwise known as § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,
as amended ("Securities Act"). Section 17(a) is the comparable antifraud provision
under the Securities Act and provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state material facts necessary in order
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transactions, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Id. Before the passage of § 17(a) there was no way for the government to police
securities fraud except for prosecuting defendants criminally. Several provisions were
available: 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988) allowed for prosecution for mail fraud; 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 (1988) allowed for prosecution for conspiring to commit mail fraud; and 39
U.S.C. § 3005 (1988) allowed for, entry of a so-called "fraud order" by the Postmaster
General, by which the Postal Service could forbid the payment of a money order
or postal note made out to the person who was the subject of the "fraud order."
See Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECuRIEs REGULATION 799 (1983).
11. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1942). In May 1942, the SEC, acting under the
authority of § 10(b), promulgated Rule 10b-5, which was originally designated X-
10B-5. The rule merely copies the language of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,
except that the reference to "obtain money or property by means of" an untrue
statement in subsection (2) was replaced with the phrase "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security." Rule lOb-5 was adopted in response to the SEC's
desire to investigate and obtain injunctive relief against insiders who were buying
their companies' stock. See Loss, supra note 10, at 820-822. Although the SEC did
not envision or intend private litigation under the rule when it was passed, the federal
courts have used the rule as a "catch-all" provision to remedy fraudulent conduct
not expressly proscribed under more precise provisions of the federal securities laws.
In the words of Chief Justice Rehnquist, Rule lob-5 is a "judicial oak which has
grown from little more than a legislative acorn." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
[Vol. 17:45
SEC RULE 10(b)
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
In 1947, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania was the first to recognize an implied private right
of action under section 10(b) in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.1
2
Although this implied right has been uniformally adopted throughout
the federal court system, critics remain."l The United States Supreme
Court first recognized a private right of action under Rule lOb-5
in 1971 .4
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 have been often criticized for
promoting vexatious and unmeritorious litigation against persons who
innocently provide services to market participants." Nevertheless, the
successful prosecution of a lOb-5 claim requires proof of an appreciable
amount of culpability. Professor Jacobs, in his authoritative treatise,
generally describes the elements of a violation of the rule by stating:
"Rule lOb-5 is violated when, by the use of jurisdictional means
and in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, any
person performs a prohibited act.' ' 6 The statement parallels the
12. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
13. E.g., Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991). "I think
the federal cause of action at issue here was never enacted by Congress ... and
hence the more narrow we make it (within the bounds of rationality) the more
faithful we are to our task." Id. at 1110 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
14. Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); see
also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972).
15. See Goldman Testimony, supra note 6, at 1; see also SIA Testimony, supra
note 6, at 8. The SIA argues that securities litigation has created confusion about
the potential liability of accountants, attorneys, banks, and securities firms because
these professionals are most likely to be drawn into cases under secondary theories
of liability. As a consequence, the SIA argues, "[T]he cost of these professionals'
services rise, with higher costs likely to be passed on to public companies and their
shareholders." See Mednick and Peck, Proportionality: A Much-Needed Solution to
the Accountants Legal Liability Crisis, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 867 (1994). Mednick and
Peck argue that "[bly mandating joint and several liability, federal securities laws
... encourage suits against 'deep pocket' defendants, such as accounting firms, for
the sole purpose of extracting settlements from those parties, regardless of their actual
responsibility, if any, for the losses suffered." Id. at 867.




express language of the rule itself. However, through judicial
interpretation of the implied right of action under section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5, the Supreme Court has gradually narrowed the scope
of liability under the rule by imposing additional requirements of
proof. In order to recover under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 the
plaintiff must prove:
(1) a use of jurisdictional means by the defendant;
7
(2) the plaintiff was a "purchaser or seller' '18 of securities; 9
17. Courts have had no difficulty in finding a jurisdictional means to invoke the
protection of Rule lOb-5. An interstate telephone call has been deemed sufficient.
Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670, 673 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
870 (1961). The use of the word "of' before "interstate commerce," rather than
"in" interstate commerce as it is defined in § 17(a) of the Securities Act, has led
some courts to hold that "the communication itself must be interstate" under §
17(a) while "intrastate use of the [interstate] facility is all that is required" under
Rule lOb-5. United States v. DeSapio, 299 F. Supp. 436, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). For
example, courts have held that an intrastate telephone call is sufficient since the
telephone itself is an instrumentality of interstate commerce. Loverage v. Dreagoux,
678 F.2d 870, 873-74 (10th Cir. 1982) (citing Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502
F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974)); Alley v. Miramon, 614 F.2d 1372, 1379 (5th Cir. 1980).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(13) (1988). Section 3(a)(13) of the Exchange Act defines
the terms "buy" and "purchase" to include "any contract to buy, purchase, or
otherwise acquire." Id. Section 3(a)(14) defines "sale" and "sell" to include "any
contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (1988). The definitions
are of little help, but are to be construed broadly. Northland Capital Corp. v. Silver,
735 F.2d 1421, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life
& Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 8-9 (1971) (holding that sale occurs when a person exchanges
title to security for something of value); First Nat'l Bank v. Estate of Russell, 657
F.2d 668, 674 n.18 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that sale occurred notwithstanding fact
that delivery of securities had not taken place). For unorthodox transactions, courts
have sought review of whether there was "some surrendering of control, change in
ownership, or change in the fundamental nature of an investment." Sacks v. Reynolds
Sec., Inc., 593 F.2d 1234, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also 5B ARNOLD JAcoaS,
LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RitE lob-5 § 38.02[b], at 2-121 to 2-122.
1.5 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(!0) (988). The term security is defined in § 3(a)(10) of
the Exchange Act. It provides:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in
any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, any
put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit,
or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on
the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered
into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in
general, any instrument commonly known as a "security;" or any certificate
of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt
for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing;
but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or
banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not
exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof
[Vol. 17:45
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(3) the defendant misstated a material fact or omitted to state
a material fact or otherwise engaged in manipulative or
deceptive conduct;
20
(4) the defendant's misstatement or omission was "in connection
with" the purchase or sale of securities;
2
1
(5) the defendant acted with scienter (an intent to deceive or
reckless disregard for the truth);
22
(6) the plaintiff reasonably relied upon the defendant's
misstatement or omission;
2a
the maturity of which is likewise limited.
Id. At least with respect to unusual kinds of securities, the Supreme Court looks at
the "economic reality" rather than the form. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S.
293, 298 (1946); see also United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,
848 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). The term "investment
contract" found within the definition of "security" has been a vehicle used to expand
the reach of the economic realities test. See Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 856
F.2d 52, 54 (8th Cir. 1988) (including an investment contract within the definition
of "security" when it was "(1) an investment, (2) in a common venture, (3) premised
on a reasonable expectation of profits, (4) to be derived from the entrepreneurial
or managerial efforts of others"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1165 (1992), and aff'd
113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993).
20. See 5B ARNOLD JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE lob-5 § 39,
at 2-414. Professor Jacobs divides the proscribed conduct under Rule lOb-5 into
seven major categories: "(1) misrepresentations and concealments when the defendant
trades; (2) misstatements and omissions when he does not buy and sell; (3) mis-
management; (4) manipulation; (5) tipping; (6) tender offers and exchange offers;
and (7) activities of broker-dealers and other fiduciaries." Id. The majority in Central
Bank concluded that § 10(b) "prohibits only the making of a material misstatement
(or omission) or the commission of a manipulative act." Central Bank v. First
Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1448 (1994).
21. The words "in connection with" serve three functions. First, they define the
scope of the rule. See Jett v. Sunderman, 840 F.2d 1487, 1494 (9th Cir. 1988)
(requiring a nexus between the fraud and the purchase or sale of securities); Financial
Corp. of America Shareholder Litig. v. Anderson & Co., 796 F.2d 1126, 1130 (9th
Cir. 1986); Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 943-44 (3d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935 (1985). Second, "in connection with" defines the
class of persons protected by the rules. See Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 841
F.2d 502, 506 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that plaintiff need not be in privity with the
defendant), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989); Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, 737 F.2d
320, 334 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that protected class is not limited to investors),
aff'd sub nom. Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985); cf. Crane Co. v. American
Standard, Inc., 603 F.2d 244, 250 & n.13 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that plaintiff must
be an investor to be protected). Third, the words "in connection with" determine
who has standing to sue. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723 (1975) (limiting standing to a buyer or seller of the security), reh'g denied, 423
U.S. 884 (1975).
22. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (holding that
negligence would not suffice for a cause of action under Rule lOb-5, but rather
scienter was required; the Court left unresolved whether "recklessness" was sufficient);
see infra pp. 60-64.
23. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988). "'The fraud on the
1994]
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(7) the plaintiff was damaged; 24 and
(8) the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff's damages.
25
Securities fraud litigation, and more precisely section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, has proven to be an intensely complex challenge for
securities lawyers. The complexity derives from the application of
numerous concepts and doctrines of liability in the context of multiple
defendants. 26 In every case of securities fraud there are persons who,
market theory is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and developed securities
market, the price of a company's stock is determined by the available material
information regarding the company and its business .... Misleading statements will
therefore defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on
the misstatements . . . ."' Id. (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d
Cir. 1986)); see also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (adopting
a rule of constructive reliance); Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534,
548 (5th Cir. 1981) (distinguishing between a subjective "reasonable reliance" concept
versus an objective "justifiable reliance" concept); Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 399 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that subjective reliance is still the
appropriate test to the extent that constructive reliance has pre-empted its application),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
24. Several measures of general damages have been adopted by courts. See Randall
v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 661-62 (1986) (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972)) (adopting "out-of-pocket" damages); Chasins v.
Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1173 (2d Cir. 1970) (adopting resale-price
damages); John R. Lewis, Inc. v. Newman, 446 F.2d 800, 805 (5th Cir. 1971)
(adopting benefit of the bargain damages). But cf. Harris v. American Inv. Co.,
523 F.2d 220, 225 n.4 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding that benefit of the bargain damages
are never appropriate under Rule lOb-5), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976).
25. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-81 (2d Cir. 1974).
The plaintiff must usually prove "transaction causation" (fraud caused the plaintiff
to enter into the transaction) and "loss causation" (transaction caused loss to the
plaintiff). Causation requires a nexus between the defendant's conduct and the
plaintiff's damage. Id. at 381. Courts have applied various tests of causation. See
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972) (requiring an
"obligation to disclose and . . . [a] withholding of a material fact . . ."); Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970) (requiring "a finding of inateriality
... [and] . . . the proxy solicitation itself .... was an essential link in the accom-
plishment of the transaction"); Ward v. Succession of Freeman, 854 F.2d 780, 790
(5th Cir. 1988) (using a proximate causation test); Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.
v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 801 F.2d 13, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom.
Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 479 U.S. 1066 (1987)
(using a foreseeability of injury test); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965) (using a
substantial factor test).
26. See David S. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases:
Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution,
120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 598-601 (1972). It has been claimed that the record number
of named defendants in a securities fraud suit is over 700 in In re Washington Pub.
Power Supply Sys. Litig., 823 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1987).
SEC RULE 10(b)
either directly or indirectly, participate in the fraudulent conduct.
These persons are primary violators of section 10(b). There are
others who do not actively participate in the conduct, but who are
involved peripherally with the transaction. Historically, courts have
imposed secondary liability on these persons, usually lawyers and
accountants, under theories of aider and abettor liability, conspiracy,
controlling person liability, or liability under general agency
principles.27 With the lower courts' reliance on implied remedies of
secondary liability, little or no emphasis has been placed on the
distinction between primary and secondary liability under section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 28 It has been stated that the distinguishing
feature between the two theories is that the primary violator either
directly or indirectly participates in the conduct proscribed by the
statute, while the secondary violator assists the primary violator's
act, or is liable for the act, based upon a relationship with the
primary violator. 29 This is simply stated, but the practical application
is imponderable. Some have argued that the distinction is illusory.30
Nevertheless, in light of Central Bank the lower federal courts will
be asked to draw this distinction, which, in some instances, will
determine the liability of the defendant.
II. THE CENTRAL BANK DECISION
A. Introduction
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. ("Central Bank") served as the
indenture trustee on two bond issues brought to market in 1986 and
1988 on behalf of the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building
Authority ("Authority").3' The issues aggregately totalled
27. See Ruder, supra note 26, at 600. Although these theories of secondary liability
have produced much litigation, liability under Rule lob-5 is usually imposed because
the defendant has been a principal participant in the proscribed conduct or has
breached an independent duty. Id.
28. See generally 5B ARNOLD JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE
lob-5 § 40.0. See also William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal
Securities Laws - Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and Agency!
Common-Law Principles and The Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L. 313, 318 (1988);
Langevoort Testimony, supra note 6, at 2.
29. See Langevoort Testimony, supra note 6, at 2; Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary
Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CAL. L. REV. 80, 80
n.4 (1981).
30. 4 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIs D. LOWENFELS, SEcuP.Trms FRAUD AND
COMMODITmS FRAUD § 8.5, at 600 (1991).
31. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1443 (1994).
19941
UALR LAW JOURNAL
$26,000,000.00, and the proceeds were used to fund improvements
at Stetson Hills, a planned residential and commercial development
located in Colorado Springs. 32 Both issues were secured by landowner
assessment liens, with 250 acres being pledged for the 1986 issue and
272 acres pledged for the 1988 issue. 3 Covenants in the indenture
required that the real estate subject to the liens have a market value
of at least 160% of the total outstanding principal and interest for
both issues.Y The covenants required the developer of Stetson Hills,
Amwest Development ("Amwest"), to deliver an annual report to
Central Bank evidencing compliance with the 160% test.
35
In January of 1988, five months prior to the issuance of the
1988 bonds, the annual report delivered by Amwest showed little
change in the market value of the real estate since 1986.36 Subsequent
to this report, Central Bank received a letter from the senior underwriter
for the 1986 issue in which the underwriter expressed concern that
the 1600 test was not being met, noting that the appraisal in the
1988 report was over sixteen months old and that property values in
Colorado Springs had declined over that period of time.37
Central Bank requested that its in-house appraiser review the
1988 report. The in-house appraiser determined that the market values
for the real estate listed in the report were "optimistic" in light of
the Colorado Springs real estate market and suggested that an
independent appraiser be retained to conduct a review of the 1988
report. 38 However, Central Bank decided to delay an independent
review until the end of the year, six months after the 1988 bond
issue was closed in June.39 An independent review was never conducted
32. Id. The 1986 bond issue totaled approximately $11 million, while the 1988
issue totaled approximately $15 million. See First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 969 F.2d
891, 894 (10th Cir. 1992).




37. Id. The letter suggested that the Authority may have provided "false or
misleading certifications" evidencing compliance with the restrictive covenants in the
bond indenture. Id. After receiving the updated appraisal, the 1986 underwriter wrote
a second letter to Central Bank questioning the outdated real estate values. See 969
F.2d at 894-95.
38. 114 S. Ct. at 1443. In a letter dated March 22, 1988, Central Bank requested
review of the appraisal by an independent appraiser citing its reasons as: "(1) [Tlhe
comparable sales data was outdated; (2) the methodology did not consider a bulk
sale in a forced liquidation context; and (3) considering the local real estate market
the values appeared unjustifiably optimistic." 969 F.2d at 894-95.
39. 969 F.2d at 895. Central Bank did require that roughly two million dollars




because the Authority defaulted on the 1988 issue prior to the end
of that year."
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. ("First Interstate") and
Jack Naber purchased $2.1 million of the 1988 issue. 41 After the
Authority defaulted, First Interstate and Naber sued the Authority,
the 1988 underwriter, a junior underwriter, and an Amwest director
for primary liability under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.42 First
Interstate and Naber also alleged that Central Bank was "secondarily
liable under section 10(b) for its conduct in aiding and abetting this
fraud."
43
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
granted Central Bank's motion for summary judgment. 4 The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals ("Tenth Circuit") reversed and remanded
the case for trial. The Tenth Circuit set forth the elements for an
aiding and abetting claim as follows: "(1) A primary violation of
section 10(b); (2) recklessness by the aider and abettor as to the
existence of the primary violation; and (3) substantial assistance given
to the primary violator by the aider and abettor. ' 45 The court found
that Central Bank was aware of the concerns regarding the accuracy
of the 1988 appraisal, that it knew that the sale of the 1988 bonds
was forthcoming, and that it knew investors would rely upon the
1988 appraisal to evaluate the collateralization of the bonds. 46 The
court then ruled that these facts supported a finding of an extreme
departure from the standard of ordinary care and that First Interstate
had established a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the
recklessness element of aiding and abetting liability.
47
Central Bank filed a writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court seeking review of "whether an indenture trustee could
be found liable as an aider and abettor . . . based only on a showing
40. Id. at 895.
41. Id.
42. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the 1988 issue was sold as a part of a fraudulent
scheme in that the official statement was materially false and misleading by (1)
representing that the updated appraisal was correct, and (2) failing to disclose that
an Amwest director, Pring, would receive almost $2 million from the issuance. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 899. With respect to the aiding and abetting allegation the district
court granted Central Bank's motion for summary judgment on the ground that
"silence and inaction are not bases to establish substantial assistance absent an
additional fiduciary duty to disclose." Id.
45. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1443 (1994) (citing
969 F.2d at 898-903).
46. 969 F.2d at 904.
47. Id. The Tenth Circuit also found a genuine issue of material fact with respect
to the element of substantial assistance, holding that if Central Bank had required
an independent review the deficient collateral would have been discovered and the
bondholders' losses avoided. Id.
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of recklessness.'"' Instead of directly responding to the question
presented, the Court sua sponte directed the parties to address the
more fundamental question of "whether private civil liability under
section 10(b) extends as well to those who do not engage in the




Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy stated that the plain text
of the statute controlled the decision determining the scope of conduct
proscribed by section 10(b). 50 Traditionally, the Court has resorted
to strict construction in deciding cases involving section 10(b).11 In
Central Bank, the Court reemphasized its adherence to strict statutory
construction of section 10(b).12 It declared that Congress knew how
to impose liability on those who aid and abet the proscribed conduct,
but did not impose it in the context of section 10(b).53 Justice Kennedy
wrote, "We cannot amend the statute to create liability for acts that
are not themselves manipulative or deceptive within the meaning of
the statute."
5 4
First Interstate and the SEC argued that the phrase "directly or
indirectly" in section 10(b) includes aiding and abetting." The Court
reasoned, however, that aiding and abetting liability extends beyond
mere indirect participation in proscribed conduct and imposes liability
on those persons who do not themselves engage in any prohibited
activity.56 The Court further reasoned that Congress has used the
phrase "directly or indirectly" in several provisions of the Exchange
Act in a way that dbes not impose aiding and abetting liability.57
48. 114 S. Ct. at 1457.
49. Id. at 1443.*
50. Id. at 1446.
51. .See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980);
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Santa Fe indus. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
52. 114 S. Ct. at 1446. The Court stated that "not every instance of financial
unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under § 10(b)." Id. (citing 445 U.S. at 232).
53. 114 S. Ct. at 1452; see Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 650 (1988); Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 572 (1979); Fischel, supra note 29, at 96-
98.
54. 114 S. Ct. at 1448. The Court declared, "When a statute speaks so specifically
in terms of manipulation and deception. . . we are quite unwilling to extend the
scope of the statute." Id. (quoting 425 U.S. at 214).
55. 114 S. Ct. at 1447.
56. Id.
57. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 78g(f)(2)(C) (1988) (direct or indirect ownership of stock);
15 U.S.C. § 78i(b)(2)-(3) (1988) (direct or indirect interest in derivative security); 15
U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1988) (direct or indirect ownership of securities); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(a) (1988) (direct or indirect ownership of securities); 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)-(b)
(1988) (direct or indirect control of person violating the Exchange Act).
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Therefore, the Court concluded that the term "indirectly" fails to
support First Interstate's suggestion that the language of the statute
itself proscribes aiding and abetting.
58
Moreover, the Court stated that even if the text of section 10(b)
did not control, it would have reached the same conclusion by
speculating how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the issue
had it expressly included a private right of action under section 10(b).19
The Court took note that none of the express private causes of action
in the federal securities law in existence at that time imposed aider
and abettor liability. Therefore, it concluded that Congress probably
would not have included such liability in a private right of action in
section 10(b).60
First Interstate and the SEC further argued that Congress intended
to make aiding and abetting liability part of the Exchange Act because
it was well established in both civil and common law and would
naturally have been included.61 Justice Kennedy noted that Congress
chose to impose certain types of secondary liability, but not others,
thus indicating a choice deliberately made by Congress "with which
courts should not interfere." 62 The Court held that "it is not plausible
to interpret the statutory silence as tantamount to an implicit
congressional intent to impose section 10(b) aiding and abetting
liability.''63
58. 114 S. Ct. at 1448.
59. Id. The Court examined the express causes of action in the securities acts,
reasoning, "Had the 73rd Congress enacted a private § 10(b) right of action, it likely
would have designed it in a manner similar to the other private rights of action in
the securities Acts." Id.
60. Id. at 1449. The Court further reasoned that to impose aider and abettor
liability under § 10(b) would circumvent the requirement that th. 'plaintiff have relied
upon the aider and abettor's statements or actions. Id. at 1450.
61. Id. at 1450.
62. Id. at 1452. Congress has imposed civil aiding and abetting liability in several
instances. See 26 U.S.C. § 6701 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (Internal Revenue Code);
7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (Commodity Exchange Act); 12 U.S.C.
§ 93(b)(8) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (National Bank Act); 12 U.S.C. § 504(h) (1988
& Supp. IV 1992) (Federal Reserve Act); 7 U.S.C. § 192(g) (1988) (Packers and
Stockyards Act). Also there are several express provisions in the securities acts imposing
civil liability for aiding and abetting. See infra pages 67-69.
63. 114 S. Ct. at 1452. At the time Congress passed the Exchange Act, eleven
states and the territory of Hawaii had enacted provisions within their blue sky laws
to impose liability upon a person who aided in fraudulent sale of securities. See
Douglas E. Abrams, The Scope of Liability Under Section 12 of the Securities Act
of 1933: "Participation" and the Pertinent Legislative Materials, 15 FoanAM URB.
L.J. 877, 945-46 & n.423 (1987).
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In support of their claim to define notions of congressional intent
broadly, First Interstate and the SEC also argued that Congress
acquiesced in the existence of aider and abettor liability, citing the
1983 and 1988 committee reports that referred to section 10(b) aider
and abettor liability coupled with a failure to amend the statute to
deny such liability. 4 Central Bank made a competing argument that
Congress intended to exclude aider and abettor liability based upon
Congress's failure to pass 1957, 1959, and 1960 bills expressly creating
such liability. 65 The Court ruled that both arguments deserved little
weight in the interpretative process and that neither argument pointed
to a definitive answer. Therefore, the Court rejected both arguments.
6
6
The SEC put forth various policy positions arguing that aider
and abettor liability deters secondary actors from assisting the fraudulent
conduct and insures that defrauded investors are made whole. 67 The
Court held that these policy arguments cannot supersede the plain
text of the statute, because adherence to the statute's text and structure
would not lead to such a bizarre result that Congress could not have
intended it.6 The Court stated that "litigation under Rule lOb-5
presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind
from that which accompanies litigation in general" and requires
secondary actors to incur larger costs even for pretrial defense and
negotiation of settlements.69 The Court declared that if aider and
abettor liability is readily available to plaintiffs, then professionals
that incur litigation expenses associated with such claims will pass
the costs on to their clients, who in turn will pass the expense on
to their investors, the intended beneficiaries of the statute.
70
64. 114 S. Ct. at 1452; see also H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-
28 (1988); H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1983). The House Report
accompanying the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983 contained the following
reference: "[Jiudicial application of the concept of aiding and abetting liability to
achieve the remedial purpose of the securities laws."d.
65. 114 S. Ct. at 1453; see also S. 2545, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 20 (1957); S.
1179, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 22 (1959); S. 3770, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. § 20 (1960).
66. 114 S. Ct. at 1453.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1453-54; see Demafest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191 (1991); Pinter
v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 654 (1988); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477
(1977).
69. 114 S. Ct. at 1454 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 739 (1975)); see 138 CONG. REc. S12605 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992) (remarks
of Sen. Sanford) (asserting that in 83% of lOb-5 cases major accounting firms pay
$1 in claims for every $8 paid in legal fees).
70. 114 S. Ct. at 1454; see Frivolous Lawsuits Hurt Shareholders, HARTFORD
COURANT, Apr. 11, 1994, at C8. In the Hartford Courant, one editorialist noted,
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Finally, the Court rejected the SEC's argument that private civil
liability under section 10(b) for aiding and abetting could be based
on 18 U.S.C. § 2, a general aiding and abetting provision applicable
to all federal crimes. 7' The Court reasoned that although an aider
and abettor can be criminally liable under any provision of the
Exchange Act, it does not follow that a civil action lies as well.
72
The logical consequence of this approach would be the creation of
implied civil damages for every criminal provision enacted for the
benefit of a particular class of persons.7 3 The Court stated that such
an approach would cause a significant and unacceptable shift in
established interpretive principles.
7 4
Justice Stevens wrote the dissenting opinion in Central Bank
stating that "the majority gives short shrift to a long history of aider
and abettor liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 ... and its
rationale imperils other well established forms of secondary liability
not expressly addressed in the securities laws. ' 71 The dissent argued
that the aiding and abetting theory is grounded in general principles
of tort law and is a "logical and natural complement" to the private
section 10(b) action that furthers the Exchange Act's purpose of
"creation and maintenance of a post-issuance securities market that
is free from fraudulent practices.''76 Justice Stevens wrote that there
is a "risk of an anachronistic error" in applying the Court's strict
statutory interpretation approach to a statute enacted in 1934, given
the fact that the Court, shortly before passage of the Exchange Act,
instructed that such "remedial legislation should receive a broader
and more liberal interpretation than that to be drawn from mere
dictionary definitions of the words employed by Congress.
77
The dissent argued that the "subtle construction of an important
federal statute should not be disturbed unless and until Congress so
decides." 7 Furthermore, Justice Stevens wrote that the evidence suggests
"These frivolous lawsuits discredit the legal profession, distract companies from their
main tasks, discourage or retard the development of new, cutting-edge businesses
and ultimately harm the interests of all shareholders." Id.
71. 114 S. Ct. at 1454-55.
72. Id. at 1455.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1456 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. Id. (quoting Brennon v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673,
680 (N.D. Ind. 1966)); see also Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21,
28 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
77. 114 S. Ct. at 1457 (quoting Piedmont & N. Ry. v. ICC, 286 U.S. 299, 311
(1932)).
78. Id. at 1458 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494
U.S. 56, 74 (1990)).
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that Congress was in favor of aider and abettor liability. Justice
Stevens based this conclusion on the fact that when Congress
comprehensively amended the Exchange Act in 1975 it left undisturbed
the large body of case law imposing private civil liability for aiding
and abetting under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 79 Furthermore, Justice
Stevens was concerned that not only private parties may be barred
from bringing suit against aiders and abettors, but also that the SEC
may be left powerless in civil enforcement actions. 0
C. Analysis of Central Bank
1. Standard of Culpability
The majority in Central Bank recognized that determining liability
under the aider and abettor doctrine has exacted costs via vexatious
litigation that "disserve[s] the goals of fair dealing and efficiency in
the securities markets."' l The Court's restrictive decision was aimed
at reducing the uncertainty and unpredictability in the application of
Rule lOb-5 and eliminating frivolous and unmeritorious claims
thereunder.12 Although the Court was given the opportunity, it declined
to address the issue that has spawned a flood of litigation and has
yet to be definitely resolved under the federal securities laws: the
standard of culpability. 3 As expressed in Justice Stevens's dissenting
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1459-60.
81. Id. at 1454.
82. Id. The Court stated that the rules for determining liability for aiding and
abetting are unclear and because of this uncertainty defendants who may be subjected
to secondary liability under the aider and abettor concept may find it necessary, "as
a business judgment, to abandon substantial defenses and to pay settlements in order
to avoid the expense and risk of going to trial." Id.; see Douglas M. Branson,
Collateral Participant Liability Under State Securities Laws, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 1027
(1992). Professor Branson describes a typical securities fraud lawsuit where the plaintiff
utilizes a tactical device called the "prisoner's dilemma." The plaintiff will isolate
one or more peripheral defendants offering a settlement that cannot be refused
compared to the costs of litigation and adverse publicity. This puts money in the
plaintiff's war chest and allows the plaintiff to proceed against the primary violators.
Id. at 1035.
83. See Goldschmid Testimony, supra note 6, at 10. Goldschmid argues that a
Supreme Court requirement including a showing of willful or intentional conduct for
a violation of § 10(b) would provide accountants, attorneys, and directors with
incentives "to simply ignore red flags suggesting fraud or egregious disclosure failures,"
because such professionals would be vulnerable to liability only if it could be proven
they actually intended the fraud. Goldschmid Testimony, supra note 6, at 10. Gold-
schmid further argues that "recklessness" is the appropriate standard under §10(b)
and Rule lob-5 for the predication of liability. But see Goldman Testimony, supra
note 6, at 6. Goldman argues that the recklessness standard is arbitrary, resembles
negligence too closely, and ignores the requirement of a duty of disclosure. Goldman
Testimony, supra note 6, at 6.
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opinion, Central Bank sought review only of the question of "whether
it could be held liable as an aider and abettor based only on a
showing of recklessness."' ' The Court never reached the issue of
culpability in Central Bank because it invalidated the underlying cause
of action altogether.
In a famous footnote, the Court left the issue of aiding and
abetting liability unresolved in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder85 where
the Court determined that scienter was required to state a cause of
action under Rule lOb-5, and that negligent conduct would not suffice.8
While the Court clarified that intentional or willful deception will
satisfy the scienter requirement, it did not decide whether recklessness
was sufficient 7 Consequently, the lower federal courts swiftly began
applying recklessness as a sufficient standard of culpability under
section 10(b).88
The lower courts, however, have found it difficult to draw a
clear line between mere negligence and recklessness, with some courts
indicating support for a sliding scale of culpability inversely related
to whether the defendant had a duty to disclose the misstatement or
omission.8 Several courts have followed the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals ("Seventh Circuit") in applying a stringent test to the
recklessness standard.9 The Seventh Circuit has held:
84. 114 S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., dissenting). By way of footnote, Justice
Stevens stated, "As I have said before, the adversary process functions most effectively
when we rely on the initiative of lawyers, rather than the activism of judges, to
fashion the questions for review." Id. at 1457 n.4.
85. 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 n.12 (1976).
86. Id.
87. Id. The Court stated:
In this opinion the term "scienter" refers to a mental state embracing intent
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In certain areas of the law recklessness
is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing
liability for some act. We need not address here the question whether, in
some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
Id.
88. See Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1990); McDonald v.
Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809 (lth Cir. 1988); Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d
824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 459 U.S. 1014 (1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 646 (1983);
Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1982); Huddleston v. Herman &
MacLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 459 U.S. 375
(1983); Pegasus Fund, Inc. v. Laraneta, 617 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1980); Rolf v.
Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039
(1978); Coleco Indus., Inc. v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 830 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554
F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1005 (1981).
89. See-Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 575 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 838 (1982).
90. See Broad v. Rockwell Int'l. Corp., 614 F.2d 418, 440 (5th Cir. 1981), reh'g
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In view of the Supreme Court's analysis in Hochfelder of the
statutory scheme of implied private remedies and express remedies,
the definition of "reckless behavior" should not be a liberal one
lest any discernable distinction between "scienter" and "negligence"
be obliterated for these purposes. We believe "reckless" in these
circumstances comes closer to being a lesser form of intent than
merely a greater decree of ordinary negligence. 91
However, not all courts have followed the Seventh Circuit's
approach. For instance, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ("Second
Circuit") has declared that Hochfelder did not establish a standard
of specific intent to defraud unless a fiduciary relationship exists
between the plaintiff and defendant. 92 Furthermore, the Second Circuit
has ruled that reckless behavior signifies "carelessness approaching
indifference" which connotes a standard closer to negligence than
intent.93 As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ("Sixth Circuit") put
it, "[T]he standard falls somewhere between intent and negligence.''
94
Although the Court refrained from addressing the culpability
issue directly in Central Bank, the Court did seem to be sending
mixed signals regarding the validity of a recklessness standard of
culpability in establishing civil liability. Some insight may be gleaned
from the'Court's declaration that "the rules for determining aiding
and abetting liability are unclear" when the nature of the securities
business requires certainty.9 Therefore, the Court reasoned, establishing
such liability on a theory of aiding and abetting would result in "ad
hoc" decisions "offering little predictive value" to business
participants. 96 The Court declined adopting a theory of liability that
yielded such results. 97 This language clearly manifests the Court's
granted, 618 F.2d 396 (1980), reh'g, 642 F.2d 929 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S 965
(1981); 617 F.2d at 1340-41; 554 F.2d at 793.
91. 554 F. 2d at 793; see also Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d
1033 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977). There, the Seventh Circuit
defined reckless conduct as:
A highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or even in-
excusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary
care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is
either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have
been aware of it.
553 F.2d at 1045.
92. Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 485
(2d Cir. 1979).
93. Id.
94. Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1025 n.36 (6th Cir.
1979).
95. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1454 (1994).




skeptical view of a recklessness standard in imposing civil liability.
It should be noted, however, that the Court seemingly buttressed its
rejection of the SEC's argument that 18 U.S.C. § 2 implies a civil
aiding and abetting cause of action under section 10(b), by contrasting
the standards of culpability between civil and criminal liability under
the Exchange Act. 98 The Court noted the inconsistency in the SEC's
argument by stating that "recklessness, not intentional wrongdoing,
is the theory underlying the aiding and abetting allegations in the
case before us."9 Although the Court did not expressly adopt a
recklessness standard for civil liability, the use of the standard to
contradict the SEC's argument impliedly suggests that the Court may
recognize its validity.
However, because the standard of culpability applied can help
determine the scope of conduct prohibited by section 10(b), the Court
will limit its analysis to the text of section 10(b). As the Court stated
in Hochfelder, "[Tihe words 'manipulative or deceptive' used in
conjunction with 'device or contrivance' strongly suggest that section
10(b) was intended to proscribe 'knowing or intentional misconduct."' °
This reference to a "knowing" standard signifies proscription of
"knowing misconduct" apart from "intentional misconduct."
Furthermore, the reference implies the Court's acceptance of this lesser
form of intent as appropriate under section 10(b).
The Court in Hochfelder suggested that recklessness may be
sufficient "in some circumstances.''0 This language is more restrictive
than the liberal test employed by the Second Circuit, which seemingly
would hold that reckless behavior is always sufficient to violate section
10(b). 0 2 The question becomes: In what circumstance, if any, does
reckless behavior constitute manipulative or deceptive conduct within
the meaning of section 10(b)? A plain reading of the words
"manipulative," "device," and "contrivance" seem to reject any
standard that falls below knowing misconduct.' 3 In light of the Court's
98. Id. at 1454-55.
99. Id. at 1455.
100. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
101. Id. at 193 n.12.
102. Edwards & Hanley v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478 (2d
Cir. 1979).
103. Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion in Central Bank, declared that the
text of § 10(b) "should receive a broader and more liberal interpretation than that
to be drawn from mere dictionary definitions of the words employed by Congress."
114 S. Ct. at 1457 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Piedmont & N. Ry. v. ICC,
286 U.S. 299, 311 (1932)). However, a series of footnotes in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder illustrates that the Court may cling to the definitional meaning of the
words "device," "contrivance," and "manipulate" in determining whether reckless
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restrictive approach in Central Bank and its jurisprudential attention
to the doctrine of fault, '°4 the continued validity of a recklessness
standard under section 10(b) may be in doubt. 05
2. Effect on SEC Enforcement Actions
Justice Stevens, in the dissenting opinion, expressed concern that
the Court's ruling would not only prohibit private plaintiffs from
bringing aiding and abetting claims, but also would apply to SEC
enforcement actions. ,o6The majority in Central Bank left some doubt
as to whether the Court's ruling would extend to SEC civil enforcement
actions, but not much. The Court relied upon the text of section
behavior is sufficient under § 10(b). Footnotes 19, 20, and 21 provide, in pertinent
part:
,9 "To let general words draw nourishment from their purpose is one thing.
To draw on some unexpressed spirit outside the bounds of the normal
meaning of words is quite another .... After all, legislation when not
expressed in technical terms is addressed to the common run of men and
is therefore to be understood according to the sense of the thing, as the
ordinary man has a right to rely on ordinary words addressed to him."
10 Webster's International Dictionary (2d ed. 1934) defines "device" as "[tihat
which is devised, or formed by design; a contrivance; an invention; project;
scheme; often, a scheme to deceive; a stratagem; an artifice," and "con-
trivance" in pertinent. part as "[a] thing contrived or used in contriving; a
scheme, plan, or artifice." In turn, "contrive" in pertinent part is defined
as "[t]o devise; to plan; to plot ... [tlo fabricate . . . design; invent ...
to scheme . .. ."
1, Webster's International Dictionary, supra, defines "manipulate" as "to
manage or treat artfully or fraudulently; as to manipulate accounts . .. ."
425 U.S. at 199 nn. 19-21. If the Court employs a strict definitional methodology,
as it did in Hochfelder, it would be difficult to argue that one has schemed, plotted,
designed, or planned without exhibiting "knowing misconduct." Id.
104. See Ruder Testimony, supra note 6, at 13. In expressing his opposition to
the applicability of the doctrine of respondeat superior under Rule lOb-5, Ruder
states there has been extensive legislative and jurisprudential attention to the doctrine
of fault in federal securities laws. Rader Testimony, supra note 6, at 13.
105. See Goldschmid Testimony, supra note 6, at 10. Professor Goldschmid im-
plored Congress to enact legislation confirming the recklessness standard under §
10(b) stating "Congress could perform no greater service to the nation in the business
law area." Goldschmid Testimony, supra note 6, at 10. The Court in Central Bank
stated, "When the text of § 10(b) does not resolve a particular issue, we attempt to
infer 'how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the issue had the lOb-5 action
been included as an express provision in the 1934 Act' . . . . For that inquiry we
use the express causes of action in the Securities Acts as the primary model for the
§ 10(b) action." Id. at 1448 (citation omitted). Section 9(e) of the Exchange Act is
a more precise fraud provision dealing with the purchase or sale of a security on
a national securities exchange as well as transactions relating to puts, calls, straddles,
or options. The express use of the term "willful" in § 9(e) further casts doubt on
the validity of the recklessness standard under § 10(b).
106. 114 S. Ct. at 1460.
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10(b) to determine that an action for aiding and abetting would not
lie."" When the Court has taken a "text-only" approach in the past
it has found no reason why its ruling should not equally apply to
both public and private plaintiffs. For example, in Hochfelder the
Court ruled that a private plaintiff could not maintain an action
under Rule lOb-5 absent an allegation of scienter.0 8 The Court expressly
reserved the question of whether its ruling would extend to an SEC
action for injunctive relief under Rule lOb-5.109
However, the Court took up the reserved question in Aaron v.
SEC'0 and held that the scienter requirement for bringing a Rule
lOb-5 action applies to the SEC as well as to private plaintiffs."'
Likewise, nothing in the majority's analysis in Central Bank limits
the holding to private plaintiffs. The Court clearly held that the
proscription in section 10(b) "does not include giving aid to a person
who commits a manipulative or deceptive act.""12 Because the SEC
derives its enforcement authority from the statute itself,"' any effort
by the SEC to pursue defendants under Rule lOb-5 as aiders and
abettors is ultra vires. Subsequent to the Court's decision in Central
Hudson, Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the SEC, publicly stated that
although an argument can be made that the Court did not intend
to restrict the SEC's ability to pursue aiders and abettors, the SEC
"will generally refrain, at this time, from asserting aiding and abetting
theories of liability where the statute does not expressly provide for
such claims. ' " 4
107. Id. at 1447.
108. 425 U.S. at 197.
109. Id. at 193-94 n.12.
110. 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
111. Id. at 691. The Court stated that "the rationale of Hochfelder ineluctably
leads to the conclusion that scienter is an element of a violation of § 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5, regardless of the identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief
sought. Two of the three factors relied upon in Hochfelder-the language of § 10(b)
and its legislative history-are applicable whenever a violation of § 10(b) or Rule
lOb-5 is alleged, whether in a private cause of action for damages or in a Commission
injunctive action ... " Id.
112. 114 S. Ct. at 1448.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988).
114. See Levitt Testimony, supra note 6, at- 8. It is possible that to the extent
that Central Bank holds that a defendant cannot be enjoined for aiding and abetting
a violation of § 10(b), it is in direct conflict with Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Rule 65(d) provides that a preliminary injunction "is binding
only upon parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees and
attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who
receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise." FED R. Crv.
P. 65(d). This provision has been interpreted to be binding upon aiders and abettors
even if such persons are not named parties to the proceeding. See Regal Knitwear
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It is unclear what affect the Central Bank decision will have on
the SEC enforcement actions. Chairman Levitt stated that "of the
420 pending [SEC] cases, we have identified about 80 cases in which
the Commission has asserted an aiding and abetting claim not expressly
provided by statute."" 5 The Chairman added that in most of these
cases the defendant is also charged as a primary violator, but cautioned,
"In at least 25 ... injunctive actions, however, one or more defendants
are charged solely under an aiding and abetting theory of liability." '" 6
Even without the ability to pursue defendants under an implied
theory of aider and abettor liability under Rule 10b-5, the SEC is
not likely to be hamstrung in its enforcement efforts. The SEC may
still enjoin primary violators under Rule lOb-5, 7 including persons
Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 14 (1945); Roe v. Operation Rescue, 919 F.2d 857, 871
(3d 'Cir. 1990); see also 2 JAmEs W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
65.13 (2d ed. 1994).
115. Levitt Testimony, supra note 6, at 8.
116. Levitt Testimony, supra note 6, at 8.
117. Section 21(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1988 & Supp. V
1993). Section 21(d) provides, "Whenever it shall appear to the [SEC] that any person
is engaged or is about to engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of any
provision of this chapter . . . it may in its discretion bring an action in the proper
district court ... to enjoin such acts or practices .... ." Id. The primary purpose
of injunctive relief against violators of federal securities laws is to deter future
violations and not to punish violators. SEC v. Kora Corp. Indus., 575 F.2d 692
(9th Cir. 1978). The grounds for which an injunction will be granted has garnered
considerable controversy. Judge Friendly reflected the current judicial attitude toward
SEC injunctions in SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., 574 F.2d 90, 99-100 (2d
Cir. 1978), where he stated:
It is fair to say that the current judicial attitude toward the issuance of
injunctions on the basis of past violations at the SEC's request has become
more circumspect than in earlier days. Experience has shown that an in-
junction, while not always a "drastic remedy" as appellants contend, often
is much more than the "mild prophylactic" described by the dissenters irr
this court in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 306 F.2d 606,
613 (2d Cir. 1962), a phrase.quoted by the Supreme Court at 375 U.S.
180, 193 (1963). In some cases the collateral consequences of an injunction
can be very grave. The Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act speak,
after all, of enjoining "any person [who] is engaged or about to engage
in any acts or practices" which constitute or will constitute a violation.
Except for the case where the SEC steps in to prevent an ongoing violation,
this language seems to require a finding of "likelihood" or "propensity"
to engage in the future violations. As said by Professor Loss, "[tihe ultimate
test is whether the defendant's past conduct indicates ... that there is a
reasonable likelihood of further violation in the future." Our recent decisions
have emphasized, perhaps more than older ones, the need for the SEC to
go beyond the mere facts of past violations and demonstrate a realistic
likelihood of recurrence. See SEC v. Universal Major Indus., 546 F.2d 1044,
1048 (2d Cir. 1976), SEC v. Parklane Hosiery, 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir.
1977), and SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 18 (2d Cir. 1977),
[Vol. 17:45
SEC RULE 10(b)
who "indirectly" violate the rule, and furthermore, may impose civil
monetary penalties against such violators of up to $100,000 for a
natural person and up to $500,000 for any other person."' It has
the power, through administrative proceedings, to discipline investment
advisors," 9 broker-dealers,120 and government and municipal securities
dealers, 2' as well as suspend, revoke, or restrict the right of an
attorney or accountant to appear before the SEC for any violation
of the securities laws.' 22
Congress, in 1990, greatly enhanced the SEC's enforcement
authority with the passage of the Securities Enforcement Remedies
and Penny Stock Reform Act ("Remedies Act").' The Remedies
Act added section 21C to' the Exchange Act and gave the SEC the
authority to issue a cease-and-desist order against any person who
violates any provision of the Exchange Act or who is "a cause of
the violation, due to an act or omission the person knew or should
have known would contribute to a violation."'2 By employing this
"negligence-sounding standard," the SEC can reach a person who
causes securities law violations as long as he "should have known"
that an act or omission would contribute to a violation, even if that
person is neither a primary violator nor an aider and abettor. The
SEC can also order accounting and disgorgement of the violator's
illegal profits,' 25 and if the cease-and-desist order is violated may seek
civil money penalties.' 26
where the court went so far as to say "[Tihe Commission cannot obtain
relief without positive proof of a reasonable likelihood that past wrong-
doing will recur."
574 F.2d at 99-100.
118. Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3) (1988 & Supp.
V 1993). Section 21(d)(3) provides: "Whenever it shall appear to the [SEC] that any
person has violated any provision of this chapter, the rules or regulations thereunder,
... the [SEC] may bring an action in a United States district court ... to seek
... a civil penalty to be paid by the person who committed such violation." Id.
119. Section 203(i) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(i)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
120. Section 15(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b) (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
121. Section 15B of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4 (1988 & Supp. V 1993);
Section 15C of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
122. Rule 2(e) of the Securities and Exchange Commission Rules of Practice, 17
C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1994).
123. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, 15
U.S.C. § 77h-1 (Supp. V 1993).
124. Section 21C of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3 (1988 & Supp. V 1993);
see also Section 8A of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77h-l (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
125. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-3(e) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
126. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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The Remedies Act also grants the SEC the authority to impose
sanctions on any broker-dealer who willfully violates or willfully aides
and abets a violation of federal securities law. 27 In this case, Congress
expressly provided for the imposition of sanctions, including the
revocation or denial of registration, on those broker-dealers who aid
and abet a federal securities law violation.'2 Furthermore, the Remedies
Act gives the SEC the authority to impose sanctions upon persons,
even if unassociated with the broker-dealer, who participate in the
distribution of a penny stock and who aid and abet a violation of
federal securities law.'1 The SEC's authority to pursue aiders and
abettors in this context is clear.
The SEC may also impose administrative sanctions on investment
advisors for willfully aiding and abetting a violation of federal securities
law. 30 Moreover, the Investment Company Act gives the SEC authority
to bar a person from serving in any capacity for an investment
company if that person aided and abetted a violation of the same
laws. '3 Furthermore, the Remedies Act supplemented SEC authority
under the foregoing provisions by authorizing the imposition of civil
monetary penalties against such broker-dealers, investment advisors,
and persons affiliated with investment companies who willfully aid
and abet a violation. 3 2 Also, Rule 2(e) of the SEC's Rules of Practice
gives the SEC authority to bar an attorney or accountant from
practicing before the SEC if such person, among other things, has
willfully aided or abetted violators of the federal securities laws.'
127. Section 15(b)(4)(E) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (1988).
128. Id.; see also Central Bank v. Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1451 (1994).
129. Section 15(b)(6)(A)(i) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(6)(A)(i) (1988
& Supp. V 1993).
130. Section 203(e)(4)-(5) of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §
80b-3(e)(4)-(5) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
,, 0e..: kf,,,4) o A.. %A CTT- § 1o.131. o.,.I U,1, .)t, U), -. 1 5 AI1V~tLA~S.~1Ld1 .. ..... ~'~ 4 ~..A.
9(b)(2)-(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
132. Section 21B of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993);
Section 9(d) of the Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(d) (1988 & Supp.
V 1993); Section 203(i) of the Investment Advisors Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(i) (1988
& Supp. V 1993).
133. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1994). Rule 2(e) provides:
The [SEC] may deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of ap-
pearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by
the Commission after notice of and opportunity for hearing in the matter
(i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to represent others, or (ii) to
be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged in unethical or
improper professional conduct, or (iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully
aided and abetted the violation of any provision of the Federal securities




As can be seen, the expressed prohibitions on aiding and abetting in
all of the aforementioned acts require a "willful" violation. What
this term means in the context of the federal securities laws is unsettled
and is sure to achieve greater emphasis after Central Bank.
Some authorities have argued that the loss of the ability to enjoin
aiders and abettors will adversely affect the SEC's enforcement
program. 3 4 However, the most likely effect is a shift in SEC resources
to its disciplinary and cease-and-desist authority and a recasting of
allegations in terms of indirect primary liability rather than aiding
and abetting liability. As Chairman Levitt stated, "The Commission's
preliminary assessment is that its enforcement program can continue
to operate effectively under these circumstances. The Commission
believes that some enforcement remedy will continue to be available
against most defendants that ... would have [been] pursued on an
aiding and abetting theory.""'
3. Status of Secondary Liability
a. Aider and Abettor Liability.
The existence and validity of a private right of action under
section 10(b) was originally based upon the tort law maxim, Ubijus,
ibi remedion - where there is a right, there is a remedy. 3 6 Courts
have borrowed from tort law the aiding and abetting theory of liability
under securities fraud. The leading case establishing the doctrine under
section 10(b) was Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co. ,'37
when, in 1968, a federal district court in Indiana held that the general
concept of aiding and abetting "has been formulated in a most helpful
134. See Langevoort Testimony, supra note 6, at 5. Langevoort argues that Congress
has recognized, as evidenced by the passage of the Remedies Act, that effective
sanctions are needed to combat securities fraud and the inability to pursue aiders
and abettors would be a significant loss. Langevoort Testimony, supra note 6, at 5.
135. See Levitt Testimony, supra note 6, at 2. Chairman Levitt expressed concern
that in some cases the SEC will pursue principal violators in federal court to obtain
civil penalties and simultaneously pursue secondiry violators in administrative actions.
Levitt Testimony, supra note 6, at 2-3.
136. Fischel, supra note 29, at 80; see also Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69
F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
137. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (motion to dismiss denied); Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968) (on the merits
after trial), aff'd 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
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manner in the Restatement of Torts § 876."131 Section 876 of the
Restatement of Torts provides:
876. Persons Acting in Concert
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct
of another, a person is liable if he
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to
a common design with him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty
and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other
so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a
tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered,
constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.'39
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana
reasoned that "[i]n the absence of a clear legislative expression to
the contrary, . . . [section 10(b)] must be flexibly applied so as to
implement its policies and purposes."' 4 Since Brennan in 1966, all
federal circuit courts of appeals have recognized the aiding and abetting
doctrine and have generally fashioned a test after section 876.' 4' The
Tenth Circuit in First Interstate Bank set forth the elements as (1)
a primary violation of section 10(b); (2) recklessness by the aider and
abettor as to the existence of a primary violation; and (3) substantial
assistance given to the primary violator by the aider and abettor.' 42
The Supreme Court, prior to Central Bank, had not reached the issue
directly, but nevertheless the Court's decision in Hochfelder suggested
138. 286 F. Supp. at 708; see Ruder, supra note 26, at 621.
139. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 (1939).
140. 259 F. Supp. at 680-81.
141. See, e.g., Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 956 F.2d 982, 986 (10th
Cir. 1992); Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 496 (4th Cir. 1991); K&S Partnership
v. Continental Bank, 952 F.2d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 1991); Levine v. Diamanthuset,
Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991); Fine v. American Solar King Corp., 919
F.2d 290, 300 (5th Cir. 1990); Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 949 (7th
Cir. 1989); Schneberger v. Wheeler, 859 F.2d 1477, 1480 (lth Cir. 1988); Moore
v. Ferex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 303 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Moore v.
Frost, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987); Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir.
1983); IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2df 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980); Monsen v. Consolidated
Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799-800 (3d Cir. 1978). But see Robin v. Arthur
Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1990) (requiring an aider and abettor
to commit one of the manipulative or deceptive acts, virtually eliminating the secondary
liability count).
142. First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 898 (10th Cir. 1992). However,
under the traditional analysis the aider and abettor must have known of the wrongful
conduct. See Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 162 (3d Cir. 1973). The knowledge
requirement is consistent with § 876(b) of the Restatement of Torts.
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that it might not recognize any of the various forms of secondary
liability, including aider and abettor liability. 13 In Hochfelder, the
Court ruled that an accounting firm could not be held liable under
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 absent a showing of scienter. By way
of a footnote, the Court stated:
In view of our holding that an intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud is required for civil liability under section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5, we need not consider whether civil liability for aiding and
abetting is appropriate under the section and the Rule .... I"
The Court looked to the word "manipulative" within section 10(b),
stating that it "connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to
deceive or defraud.' 45 Under a strict aiding and abetting theory it
makes no difference whether the aider and abettor engaged in
"intentional or willful conduct." Some argued that this strict statutory
approach implicitly invalidated the doctrine.' 46
After Hochfelder, courts began questioning the validity of the
aiding and abetting theory. 47 Recently, both the Fifth and Seventh
Circuit Courts of Appeals heightened the confusion concerning the
doctrine. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ("Fifth Circuit") stated:
[Ilt is now apparent that open-ended readings of the duty stated
by Rule lOb-5 threaten to rearrange the congressional scheme. The
added layer of liability... for aiding and abetting... is particularly
problematic .... There is a powerful argument that ... aider
and abettor liability should not be enforceable by private parties
pursuing an implied right of action.' 4
The Seventh Circuit, in effect, invalidated aider and abettor liability
by holding that a defendant must actively commit a manipulative or
143. See Fischel, supra note 29, at 82, 87. Fischel argued that in light of the
Supreme Court's strict statutory approach and emphasis on the text of federal securities
statutes, all forms of secondary liability under those statutes are no longer viable.
In the aftermath of the Court's decision in Central Bank, Fischel's prognostication
has proven to be quite accurate.
144. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 191 n.7.
145. Id. at 199; see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir.
1968) (Friendly, J. concurring), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976
(1969); Loss, supra note 10, at 884.
146. See Fischel, supra note 29, at 88.
147. See, e.g., Benoay v. Decker, 517 F. Supp. 490, 495 (E.D. Mich. 1981), aff'd,
735 F.2d 1363 (6th" Cir. 1984) (stating that it was "doubtful that a claim for 'aiding
and abetting' . . will continue to exist under § 10(b)"); see also Little v. Valley
Nat'l Bank, 650 F.2d 218, 220 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) (declaring that the "status of
aiding and abetting as a basis for liability under the securities laws is in some doubt").
148. Akin v. Q-L Invs., Inc., 959 F.2d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1992).
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deceptive act to be liable under section 10(b). 49 In addition, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals ("Ninth Circuit") raised serious questions
about the doctrine's validity in light of the Supreme Court's adherence
to strict statutory construction of the securities laws by noting:
[A]iding and abetting and other 'add-on' thieories of liability have
been justified by reference to the broad policy objectives of the
securities acts .... The Supreme Court has rejected this justification
for an expansive reading of the statutes and instead prescribed a
strict statutory construction approach to determining liability under
the acts. 50
It has been suggested that the Court's decision in Central Bank may
have been a response to the questions posed by the various circuit
courts.'
Although the Court invalidated aiding and abetting liability only
under section 10(b), the use of the doctrine under other provisions
where courts have recognized implied private remedies is now in
jeopardy. Courts have applied the doctrine with respect to violations
of section 5 of the Securities Act (illegal sale of unregistered stock),
5 2
section 12(2) of the Securities Act (materially misleading prospectus),
5
1
section 17 of the Securities Act (comparable anti-fraud provision), '1
4
and Rule 14a-9 (materially misleading proxy statement).' 55 The "text-
only" approach applied in Central Bank would likely invalidate aiding
and abetting liability under these provisions as well. As the Court in
Central Bank noted, the statutory text controls the definition of
conduct, and this "bodes ill" for the imposition of aider and abettor
149. See, e.g., Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 495
(7th Cir. 1986).
150. SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1311 n.12 (9th Cir. 1982).
151. See Claudia MacLachlon, High Court Hears Case on Private Securities Law-
suits, 16 NAT'L L.J. 17 (1993).
152. See, e.g., SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); Stern v. American Bankshares Corp., 429
F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
153. See, e.g., Mabon, Nugent & Co. v. Borey, 127 B.R. 727 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1991); Hill v. Equitable Bank, 599 F. Supp. 1062 (D. Del. 1984). But cf. Frymire
v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 657 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (holding that
§ 12(2) imposes liability only on sellers of securities); Harrison v. Enventure Capital
Group, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 473 (W.D.N.Y. 1987); Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
& Co., 666 F. Supp. 1500 (W.D. Okla. 1987), aff'd, 956 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1992);
Hagert v. Glickman, Lurie, Eiger & Co., 520 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Minn. 1981).
154. See, e.g., Cleary v. Perfectune, 700 F.2d 774 (1st Cir. 1983); Little v. Valley
Nat'l Bank, 650 F.2d 218 (9th Cir. 1981); SEC v. Cooper, 402 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
155. See, e.g., Lazzarro v. Manber, 701 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Leff v.
CIP Corp., 540 F. Supp. 857 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
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liability under the above-referenced provisions, for the language of
those provisions does not mention aiding and abetting.
b. Conspiracy Liability
Conspiracy is a doctrine borrowed from the criminal and tort
law that the federal courts have applied to fraud claims under section
10(b).' 56 In fact, Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,5 7 where a private
right of action under section 10(b) was first recognized, involved an
allegation of conspiracy. Used primarily in the "sale of control" cases,
conspiracy is a form of secondary liability that reaches peripheral
defendants if they "conspired" with the primary violator."" Conspiracy
can be distinguished from aiding and abetting by the former's
prerequisite of an agreement. 5 9 To prove conspiracy the plaintiff must
present evidence showing an agreement by two or more persons to
engage in the proscribed conduct and that at least one overt act has
been committed in furtherance of the agreement.16 Any person who
is a party to the conspiracy is legally responsible for the acts taken
by co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.'
6'
156. See Fischel, supra note 29, at 85; Kuehnle, supra note 28, at 343.
157. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
158. See Kuehnle, supra note 28, at 343. Kuehnle notes that some plaintiffs have
confused conspiracy with other substantive violations such as a "scheme." This
concept is best illustrated in United States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225 (Ith Cir. 1981),
where the Seventh Circuit stated:
A scheme to defraud and conspiracy embrace analogous, but not identical,
concepts .... The elements of the offenses are, however, different. The
predicate for liability for conspiracy is an agreement .... Mail and securities
fraud, on the other hand, punish the act of using the mails or the securities
exchanges to further a scheme to defraud .... As an aider and abettor,
Spiegel need not agree to the scheme. He need only associate himself with
the criminal venture and participate in it.
Id. at 1239-40 (citation omitted).
It has been argued that a "scheme to defraud" may be within the scope of a
"deceptive device or contrivance" in the text of § 10(b) and, therefore, may be a
viable alternative to impose liability on peripheral actors who, prior to Central Bank,
were found liable under the aiding and abetting theory. See Harold S. Bloomenthal,
16 Sec. & Fed. Corp. L. Rep. (Clark Boardman), No. 8, at 149 (August 1994).
159. See Ruder, supra note 26, at 627. Ruder discusses conspiracy in the criminal
context and relies upon Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946), where
Justice Rutledge distinguished conspiracy from aiding and abetting by stating:
The gist of conspiracy is the agreement; that of aiding, abetting or counseling
is in consciously advising or assisting another to commit particular offenses,
and thus becoming a party to them; that of substantive crime, going a step
beyond mere aiding, abetting, counseling to completion of the offense.
328 U.S. at 649.
160. See Kuehnle, supra note 28, at 346.
161. See Kuehnle, supra note 28, at 346.
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Liability for the acts of co-conspirators can enlarge the scope of
damages beyond that imposed by aider and abettor liability because
a defendant can be held liable for acts that occurred prior to his
joining the conspiracy. 62 Likewise, a defendant can be held liable for
the acts of others even after the commission of the defendant's last
act. 63 If the statute of limitations has run on the defendant's act,
he still may be liable for the acts of his co-conspirators. 6" For example,
in the context of a "sale of control" case, the Seventh Circuit held
that the defendant, who had resigned as a director and sold his stock
prior to a fraudulent merger, was nevertheless liable as a conspirator. 65
The court stated:
[The Defendant's] sale of his stock and his resignation as a director
were allegedly two of the overt acts done by him in furtherance
of the conspiracy. Thus, having allegedly joined the conspiracy
and taken steps to assure its success, [the Defendant] is responsible
for the acts of his co-conspirators in furtherance of said conspiracy. 66
To date, the conspiracy theory under section 10(b) has been used
relatively seldom, primarily due to the wide acceptance of aider and
abettor liability. 67 Given the Court's restrictive approach in Central
Bank, the conspiracy theory is not likely to be a viable alternative
to aiding and abetting liability. Neither the text nor the legislative
history of section 10(b) refer to conspiracy liability; therefore, it
appears that the concern expressed by the dissent in Central Bank
that the Court's decision "would sweep away the decisions recognizing
that a defendant may be found liable ... for conspiring to violate
section 10(b) . . ."1'" is well-founded.
c. Controlling Person Liability
Section 15 of the Securities Act'6 and section 20(a) of the Exchange
Act 70 expressly provide for the imposition of liability upon those
162. Kuehnle, supra note 28, at 344 n.175; see, e.g., In re Nissan Motor Corp.
Antitrust Litig., 430 F. Supp. 231, 233 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
163. Kuehnle, supra note 28, at 344 n.175.
164. See, e.g., United States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225, 1231-40 (7th Cir. 1981).
165. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 977 (1967).
166. Id. at 267 n.2.
167. See Langevoort Testimony, supra note 6, at 4. But see U.S. Indus. v. Touche
Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 1223, 1231 (10th Cir. 1988); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304,
1316 (6th Cir. 1974); Ferguson v. Omnimedia, Inc., 469 F.2d 194, 197-98 (1st Cir.
1972); Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819, 827 n.13 (5th Cir. 1970).
168. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1460 n.12 (1994)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. Section 15 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1988), provides:
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persons who "control" the person who violates any provision of each
respective act. Section 15 of the Securities Act imposes vicarious
liability on those persons who "control" a person who substantively
violates section 11 (misrepresentations in a registration statement), 7 '
section 12(1) (unlawful sale of unregistered securities), 72 section 12(2)
(materially misleading prospectus),'7 as well as other provisions in
the Securities Act. Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act imposes vicarious
liability on the person who "controls" a person who substantively
violates Rule lOb-5 (fraud using means of interstate commerce),
74
Rule 14a-9 (fraud in connection with proxy solicitations), 175 and section
18(a) of the Exchange Act (misrepresentations in documents filed with
the SEC).
176
In Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 7 the Second Circuit attempted to
define the boundaries of who is a "controlling person" under section
20(a) in the context of whether a certain board member was culpable
for the conduct of a corporate officer. The court imposed liability
on the director and in doing so held that absent direct participation
in the fraud, liability can only be imposed on persons "who in some
meaningful sense are culpable participants in the fraud perpetrated."'' 78
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency or otherwise, or
who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding with
one or more persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise,
controls any person liable under Section 11 or 12 . . . shall also be liable
jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person
to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling
person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence
of facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged
to exist.
Id.
170. Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1988), provides:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under
any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall
also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such
controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable,
unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not directly or
indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
Id.
171. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988).
172. 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1988).
173. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988).
174. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994).
175. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1994).
176. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1988).
177. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
178. Id. at 1299. The Second Circuit must have intended something less than actual
participation, the existence of which would eliminate the necessity of relying upon
19941
UALR LAW JOURNAL
The Ninth Circuit, in Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp. ,79 seemingly
commingled the "culpable participant" standard with the underlying
consideration of control, holding absolutely that a "broker-dealer is
a controlling person under section 20(a) with respect to its registered
representatives."' 80 However, the Seventh Circuit has positioned itself
somewhere in the middle of the Second and Ninth Circuits, interpreting
the "culpable participant" standard to require that the defendant
excercise some degree of control over the principal violator. 8' The
Seventh Circuit overruled a lower court which applied the "culpable
participant" standard, observing that "the district court used a test
we have never approved, a test, the rigors of which contravene our
prior holdings.' '1 82 Moreover, the court added, "nor have we construed
[the determination of who is a controlling person under Section 20(a)]
as broadly as the court in Hollinger."'83
Both section 15 and section 20(a) contain affirmative defenses
to liability and although courts construe the defenses similarly, the
provisions, at least technically, can be distinguished.184 The section
15 defendant can avoid liability by affirmatively asserting and proving
that "he had no knowledge of or reasonable ground[s] to believe in
the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the
controlled person is alleged to exist.' ' 85 Under section 20(a) the
controlling person can elude liability by proving that he didn't induce
the acts of the primary violators, either directly or indirectly, and
that he acted in good faith.' s8 A distinction can be drawn between
the two provisions in that the section 15 defendant must prove that
he was not negligent, while the section 20(a) defendant must prove
that he acted in good faith. Courts have struggled with giving a
definition to the "good faith" standard and, to date, the issue has
not been resolved by the Supreme Court. 87 However, in G. A.
§-n(a fnr th imp sition of liability. See Harold S. Bloomenthal, The Implications
of Central Bank, 16 Sec. & Fed. Corp. L. Rep. (Clark Boardman), No. 6, at 134
(June 1994).
179. 914 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991).
180. Id. at 1573.
181. Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2994 (1993).
182. Id. at 877.
183. Id. at 881.
184. See Bloomenthal, supra note 178, at 134.
185. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1988).
186. 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1988).
187. The Court has used Section 20(a) to illustrate a state-of-mind requirement
that is greater than negligence. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208 n.26,
reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976).
[Vol. 17:45
SEC RULE 10(b)
Thompson & Co. v. Patridge,88 the Fifth Circuit declared that "a
negligence standard is inappropriate" and held that "recklessly" failing
to supervise or monitor the conduct of the principal violator is
actionable.'8 9
Several circuit courts have concluded that section 20(a)'s controlling
person liability is not exclusive and does not preclude the imposition
of liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 pursuant to the common
law tort doctrine of respondeat superior. 90 These courts have viewed
section 20(a) as inadequate when the controlling person has acted in
good faith but nevertheless put the primary violator in a position to
commit fraud. 9' In light of Central Bank, the future application of
the common law doctrine of respondeat superior is questionable.
The Fifth Circuit relied heavily on policy considerations in Paul
F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank,192 holding that section
20(a) was not the exclusive form of secondary liability under the
Exchange Act. The Court noted that neither the legislative history of
section 15 nor section 20(a) reveals whether Congress "intended to
supplant common law agency principles for determining secondary
liability or simply to expand the group of persons secondarily liable
for violations of the Securities Act by imposing liability on certain
188. 636 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1981).
189. Id. at 959-60.
190. See, e.g., Hollinger v. Tital Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1576-77 (9th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991); In re Atlantic Fin. Mgmt., Inc., 784 F.2d
29, 31 (lst Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom. AZL Resources, Inc. v. Margaret Hall
Found., Inc., 481 U.S. 1072 (1987); Commerford v. Olson, 794 F.2d 1319, 1323
(8th Cir. 1986); Marbury Mgmt., Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 713 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank,
630 F.2d 1111, 1118-19 (5th Cir. 1980), reh'g denied, 634 F.2d 1355 (5th Cir. 1980);
Hollaway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 694-95 (6th Cir. 1976); Carras v. Bums, 516
F.2d 251, 259 (4th Cir. 1975); Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1052-53 (7th
Cir. 1974); Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 740-41 (10th Cir. 1974).
The Third Circuit has recognized the application of the doctrine in certain circum-
stances. Compare Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 885-86 (3d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976) with Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175,
180-84 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982). The common law doctrine
of respondeat superior holds employers strictly liable for the acts of their employees
if those acts were committed within the scope of employment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 257 (1958); 502 F.2d at 740-41.
191. See Langevoort Testimony, supra note 6, at 4. Langevoort argues that res-
pondeat superior may have continued validity after Central Bank in part because
"[r]espondeat superior is a central tenant of tort law, in contrast to the insignificant
status the Court found for aiding and abetting [in] the common law scheme."
Langevoort Testimony, supra note 6, at 4.




'controlling persons' who might not be liable under common law
principles."' 19
Although the Court in Central Bank stated that "the interpretation
given by one Congress .. . to an earlier statute is of little assistance
in discerning the meaning of that statute,' 1 94 support for the
incorporation of respondeat superior can be found in the legislative
history of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act
of 1988 ("Insider Trading Act"). 95 Congress expressly excluded
respondeat superior liability in two provisions in the Insider Trading
Act regarding the liability of employers resulting from the trading of
securities by their employees. 19' However, Congress stated in the
legislative history that "the legislation does not effect the applicability
of the respondeat superior theory in [SEC] action or under the federal
securities laws generally."' 97 Furthermore, the Exchange Act does
include a savings clause that states: "The rights and remedies provided
by this subchapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights
and remedies that may exist at law or in equity."'' This provision
arguably illustrates Congress's rejection of the notion that the express
remedies of the securities laws would preempt all other rights of
action' 99 and supports the recognition of respondeat superior liability
under section 10(b).
Nevertheless, given the fact that the doctrine of respondeat superior
is not expressed within the text of section 10(b) and because application
of the doctrine is seemingly inconsistent with the expressed language
of section 20(a), the validity of the doctrine is in doubt. A textual
argument can be made, however, that section 10(b)'s reference to any
"person" expressly includes "companies" as well as natural persons
via the definition of the term in section 3(a)(9) in the Exchange Act."
193. Id.
194. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1452 (1994) (quoting
Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 168 (1989)); See Weinberger
v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35 (1982).
195. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988). The Insider Trading Act added
new § 20A (15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (1988)) and § 21A (15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1988)) to the
Exchange Act. Section 20A provides that any person who trades a security while in
possession of material nonpublic information regarding that security is liable to any
person who was "contemporaneously" trading the security on the other side of the
market. Section 21A authorizes the SEC to seek civil penalties against such person
in amount equal to three times the amount of profit realized or loss avoided by the
trade.
196. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(b)(3) (1988); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(b)(1) (1988).
197. H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 n.23 (1988) (citations omitted).
198. Section 28(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1988).
199. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 383 (1983).
200. See Langevoort Testimony, supra note 6, at 4.
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By implication, it can be argued that Congress must have intended
some form of agency ascription in order to give effect to the definition
of "person." This argument, however, is not likely to prevail. The
majority in Central Bank held that with respect to the "scope of
conduct prohibited by section 10(b), the text of the statute controls
our decision." 20' The terms "deceptive" or "manipulative" in section
10(b) have been interpreted by the Court as requiring some degree
of fault.2 2 Respondeat superior, as traditionally applied, is a doctrine
that imposes strict liability on the principal apart from the showing
of any culpability.m Therefore, the doctrine is substantively inconsistent
with the express language of the statute. Furthermore, the recognition
of the doctrine by lower federal courts has effectively read section
20(a) out of the Exchange Act, which undoubtedly was not the intent
of Congress. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the term
"person" as it is defined in section 3(a)(9) was merely intended to
expand the category of persons that could be held primarily liable
under section 10(b) and not to impose vicarious liability on persons
who have not engaged in conduct proscribed by the statute. As the
Court in Central Bank stated, Congress knew how to impose aider
and abettor liability when it wanted. So also does Congress know
how to impose respondeat superior liability, and it did not do so
within the text of section 10(b).
4. Scope of Conduct
There is no doubt that the scope of conduct proscribed by section
10(b) was restricted in Central Bank. However, the impact this restriction
will have on litigation under section 10(b) is not clear. For almost
two decades the Supreme Court, applying a strict statutory approach,
has restricted the scope of conduct under section 10(b), only to have
the lower federal courts expand the scope under different theories or
standards. 24 For example, in Hochfelder, the Court held a showing
of scienter was required to sustain an action under section 10(b). 25
The lower courts expanded the use of "recklessness" to satisfy this
requirement.1 In Santa Fe Industries v. Green,2 the Court held that
201. 114 S. Ct. at 1446.
202. See Ruder Testimony, supra note 6, at 13. Ruder states: "In view of the
extensive legislative and jurisprudential attention to the doctrine of fault or culpability
in the federal securities laws, the doctrine of respondeat superior should not be
applicable under Rule 10b-5." Rader Testimony, supra note 6, at 13.
203. Rader Testimony, supra note 6, at 13.
204. See Langevoort Testimony, supra note 6, at 1.
205. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
206. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
207. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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"breaches of fiduciary duty by a majority against minority shareholders
without any charge of misrepresentation or lack of disclosure" does
not violate section 10(b).203 The lower courts expanded the scope of
conduct under the theory that fiduciary breaches were actionable as
long as the breach was concealed from shareholders and could have
been remedied in state court.3 In Chiarella v. United States, the
Court required an independent duty of disclosure for insider trading
liability.210 The lower courts countered with a misappropriation theory
of liability.
21'
Again, the path is clear for the lower courts to moderate the
ruling in Central Bank. The phrase "directly or indirectly" in the
text of section 10(b) could be the lower courts' cornerstone to expand
the scope of conduct to cover those defendants once charged with
aiding and abetting.212 Even the majority in Central Bank concluded
that the scope of conduct covered by section 10(b) need not be
narrow, stating:
The absence of section 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does not
mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are always
free from liability under the securities Acts. Any person or entity,
including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative
device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which
a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary
violator under section 10(b), assuming all of the requirements for
primary liability under Rule lOb-5 are met.211
Courts have given little attention to the distinction between
"indirect" primary and secondary liability under section 10(b). 214 The
208. Id. at 470 (quoting Green v. Santa Fe Indus., 533 F.2d 1283, 1287 (2d Cir.
1976)).
209. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 225 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1069 (1978) (Meskill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) Judge
Meskiii stated:
Those who breach their fiduciary duties seldom disclose their intentions
ahead of time. Yet under the majority's reasoning the failure to inform
stockholders of a proposed defalcation gives rise to a cause of action under
10b-5. Thus, the majority has neatly undone the holdings of Green ... by
creating a federal cause of action for a breach of fiduciary duty that will
apply in all cases, save for those rare instances where the fiduciary denounces
himself in advance.
Id.
210. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
211. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); SEC v. Materia,
745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985).
212. See Goldschmid Testimony, supra note 6, at 6.
213. 114 S. Ct. at 1455.
214. See 5B ARNOLD JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10b-5 § 40
(rev. ed. 1993); see also Langevoort Testimony, supra note 6, at 2.
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line between the two has been characterized as "indistinct" and
"virtually nonexistent.' '215 In fact, the Fifth Circuit recently stated
that the imposition of aiding and abetting liability in some cases has
been illusory, declaring that the defendant's conduct is better described
in terms of primary liability. 2 6 Although the Court in Central Bank
indicated that not every allegation of aiding and abetting could be
recast in terms of primary liability, the relatively few lower court
decisions addressing the issue show that "indirect" primary liability
could potentially have an exceedingly broad scope.
217
Clearly, any person who makes a material misstatement directly
to investors may be a primary violator of section 10(b). 21 s For example,
the accountant who certifies an issuer's financial statements or the
attorney who writes an opinion that he knows contains materially
false information may be primarily liable. In each instance the investor
relies not only on the financial statements or opinion but upon the
credibility of the source.
219
The more complex issue requiring a finer distinction is the
availability of imposing primary liability on those participants who
merely prepare the issuer's disclosure documents. Consider the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 2 where the
court found that a group of corporate officers were primary violators
of section 10(b), reasoning that through concerted action the officers
caused the issuer to disseminate a materially misleading press release.
221
The distinction was also analyzed in Molecular Technology Corp. v.
Valentine,m where the Sixth Circuit found an attorney primarily liable
215. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
217. Goldschmid Testimony, supra note 6, at 6. Goldschmid states that courts will
be confronted, at best, with years of wasteful litigation before "indirect" primary
liability recaptures the ground once occupied by aider and abettor liability. Goldschmid
Testimony, supra note 6, at 6. Some courts have determined that under Section 5
of the Securities Act (i.e., 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988)), the defendant must be a "necessary
and substantial" participant in an unregistered sale of securities to be liable as a
primary violator.. See, e.g., SEC v. Holschuh, 694 F.2d 130, 139-42 (7th Cir. 1982).
Some courts may employ this test in the context of § 10(b) also.
218. See Langevoort Testimony, supra note 6, at 2.
219. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Schwarts, 947 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that
investors in a tax shelter scheme could proceed with § 10(b) claim against an attorney
who wrote opinion letter for the offering literature); see also Commercial Discount
Corp. v. Lincoln First Commercial Corp., 445 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (allowing
a § 10(b) action against accountants based upon plaintiffs' reliance on unqualified
certification of bankrupt company's books).
220. 818 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1987).
221. Id. at 1440.
222. 925 F.2d 910, 917-18 (6th Cir. 1991).
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for merely reviewing and editing disclosure materials of the issuer. 3
What about corporate insiders, attorneys, accountants, or bankers
who play no role in the preparation of disclosure materials, but who
are aware of their falsity and otherwise assist the issuer? Are these
persons primarily liable under section 10(b)? Possibly, if they owe
an affirmative duty to disclose the false information to investors.
Several courts have found that such a duty exists when it is shown
that the investors have reasonably relied upon these peripheral actors
for the truth.224 In Chiarella, the Supreme Court stated that
nondisclosure of a material fact is actionable only if "such liability
is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of
trust and confidence. . .. "22 In Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves,m
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ("Eighth Circuit"), citing Chiarella,
held:
A relationship for purposes of. Rule lOb-5 liability ... requires
neither a "physical presence nor face to face conversation." Rather,
whether a relationship exists that gives rise to a duty to disclose
depends on the circumstances of the individual case. The Fifth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have established a number of factors
to be used in evaluating those circumstances, including (1) the
parties' relative access to the information; (2) the benefit the
defendant derives from ... [the transaction]; (3) the defendant's
awareness of the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant in making
investment decisions; and (4) the defendant's role in initiating the
sale. In addition, the Eleventh Circuit also considers (5) the extent
of the defendant's knowledge; (6) the significance of the
nondisclosure; and (7) the extent of the defendant's participation
in the fraud.2
7
Such a test could easily be applied to peripheral actors who remain
silent in the face of the securities fraud of their associates. However,
the courts' increased emphasis on culpability when the defendant is
remote from the fraud will likely remain. Even undcr the preCentral
Bank scheme, alders and abettors often incurred liability only when
223. Id.; see also Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver Ltd., 941 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991);
In re Rospatch Sec. Litigation, 802 F. Supp. 110 (W.D. Mich. 1992), aff'd sub nom.
Atlantis Group, Inc. v. Warner, Norcross & Judd, 28 F.3d 1213 (6th Cir. 1994).
224. See, e.g., Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1329-31 (8th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1165 (1992).
225. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980).
226. 937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1165 (1992).
227. Id. at 1329-31 (citations omitted).
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"engage[d] in conduct that intentionally misleads or lulls ... [the]
victim. ' '
It is clear that the majority in Central Bank was concerned about
the uncertainty and excessiveness of litigation under Rule
lOb-5, asserting that "the rules for determining aiding and abetting
liability are unclear, in 'an area that demands certainty and
predictability.'229 However, from a practical standpoint, the Court
has exacerbated the uncertainty of liability under the provision. The
distinction between being "indirectly" engaged in proscribed conduct
and merely aiding another party's proscribed conduct is sure to create
a vast vacuum that aggressive plaintiffs' counsel and some lower
courts are sure to fill. Consequently, the prediction that the scope
of conduct covered under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 will be greatly
restricted is unwarranted. The decision is more likely to only alter
the form and language in which liability is cast.
23
0
III. THE RESPONSE TO CENTAL BANK
A. The Court's Invitation
The reaction to the Court's decision in Central Bank was either
one of euphoria or despair, depending upon one's perspective. Some
believe that the decision is likely to draw a response from Congress. 23
The Court clearly invited congressional review by stating:
To be sure, aiding and abetting a wrongdoer ought to be actionable
in certain instances. The issue however, is not whether imposing
private civil liability on aiders and abettors is good policy but
whether aiding and abetting is covered by the statute.232
One major law firm sent out a memo to its clients three days after
the decision warning:
There are reports that legislation will be introduced in Congress
in response to the Court's decision. Therefore, those clients who
228. IX Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SEcurrTIEs REGULATION 4486 (3d ed. 1992);
see also K&S Partnership v. Continental Bank, 952 F.2d 971, 980 (8th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2993 (1992).
229. 114 S. Ct. at 1454 (quoting Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 652 (1988)).
230. Instead of pleading that a defendant aided and abetted the securities fraud,
complaints will be cast in terms alleging that the defendant, himself, indirectly
participated in the securities fraud.
231. See Marianne Lavelle, Lawyers and Accountants Hail Dodd-Domenici Bill;
After the Central Bank Decision, Lobbying Heats Up for a Law Aimed at Curbing
Some Investor Securities Suits, NAT'L L.J., May 9, 1994, at B1.
232. 114 S. Ct. at 1448 (citation omitted).
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are defendants in Section 10(b) cases involving private claims that
allege aiding and abetting should immediately seek a final judgment
dismissing those claims to minimize the impact of new legislation.
233
Indeed, prior to Central Bank, Senators Dodd 2- and Domenici 235 had
already introduced a reform bill, the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1994 ("Act"),236 which some view as being "dressed
up in anti-lawyer rhetoric [but] more accurately ... seen as anti-
investor in nature.
23 7
On May 12, 1994, the Senate Subcommittee on Securities, a
subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, held a hearing concerning the Central Bank decision.
Several experts testified as to the alternatives Congress should consider
in determining whether to respond to the decision. 23 Opinions were
mixed, but most agreed that Congress should not pursue a "quick
fix" by passing piecemeal legislation aimed only at addressing Central
Bank. Instead, Congress should comprehensively review the entire
liability scheme. 239 It appears that Congress will do so in the context
of debate over the Act. The Act, in its present form, does not contain
a provision to overrule the Court's decision in Central Bank. At the
hearing, Senator Metzenbaum m stated that language to that effect
had already been drafted, but that he would refrain from offering
it as an amendment until the effects of Central Bank could be fully
evidenced. 241 However, Senator Metzenbaum cautioned against
233. See Metzenbaum Testimony, supra note 6, at 2.
234. Senator Christopher J. Dodd is a Democrat from Connecticut. He was elected
in 1980 and is the Chairman of Subcommittee on Securities of the Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. He is also a member of Budget,- Foreign
Relations, Labor and Human Resources, and Rules and Administrative Committees.
235. Senator Pete V. Domenici is a Republican from New Mexico. He was elected
in 1972 and is a member of Subcommittee on Securities of the Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs. He is also a member of Appropriations, Budget, Energy
and National Resources, and Select Indian Affairs Committees.
236. S. 1976, the "Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1994" [hereinafter
"The Act"], introduced on March 24, 1994, by Senators Dodd and Domenici.
237. See NASAA Testimony, supra note 6, at 6.
238. See supra note 6.
239. See SIA Testimony, supra note 6, at 15; Langevoort Testimony, supra note
6, at 7; Goldman Testimony, supra note 6, at 1-2. But see NASAA Testimony,
supra note 6, at 10 ("NASAA respectfully encourages Congress to enact limited
legislation to reverse the Supreme Court's Central Bank Decision."); Goldschmid
Testimony, supra note 6, at 8 ("Congress should, as expeditiously as practicable -
legislatively overrule Central Bank . . . ").
240. Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum is a Democrat from Ohio. He was elected
in 1976 and is a member of Environment and Public Works, Judiciary, Labor and
Human Resources, and Select Intelligence Committees.
241. On July 21, 1994, Senator Metzenbaum introduced Senate Bill S. 2306, the
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procrastination stating, "[D]elay can be so costly that I will find a
legislative vehicle if this committee does not see fit to act promptly.''242
Following is a brief overview of some of the Act's controversial
provisions, a description of the substantive law the Act would modify,
and the possible consequences of the Act's passage.243
B. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1994
1. Joint and Several Liability
Under existing law, each defendant in a Rule lOb-5 action, whether
primarily or secondarily responsible for violating the Rule, is jointly
and severally liable for damages resulting from the violation. 24 In
theory, the effect of joint and several liability under Rule lOb-5 has
been offset somewhat by the Court's recognition of a right of
contribution in Musick, Peeler & Garret v. Employers Ins. of Wausau.245
However, in reality, the key fraudulent actor is often defunct or
bankrupt, and the plaintiff is left pursuing peripheral actors, such as
attorneys, accountants, and other professionals, for recovery.
24
As expressed by opponents of the Act, the rationale supporting
the imposition of joint and several liability is that the fraud would
have failed if one of the actors revealed its existence; therefore, all
"Securities Fraud Fairness Act." Section 2 of the Act would amend Section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act by inserting "or to aid and abet the use or employment of
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance," before "in contravention"
within the text of Section 10(b).
242. See Mettenbaum Testimony, supra note 6, at 3.
243. The Act contains several provisions not discussed in this Article. These pro-
visions include, but are not limited to, the elimination of certain abusive practices
(i.e., prohibition on the receipt of referral fees by broker-dealers, prohibition on the
receipt of attorney's fees paid from SEC disgorgement funds, limitations on attorney's
fees from private litigation settlement funds, prohibition on disproportionate share
of recovery by the named plaintiff in a class action suit, and provisions for the
disqualification of attorneys with conflicts of interest). The Act also contains an
alternative dispute resolution procedure, a provision to establish guardians ad litem
and class action steering committees, a safe-harbour provision for forward looking
statements, and a section regarding fraud detection and disclosure. Furthermore, the
Act would establish the Public Auditing Self-Disciplinary Board which would be
charged with overseeing the regulation of public accounting firms.
244. See 5D ARNIoD JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACICE UNrDE Rt lob-5 § 260.030)
(rev. ed. 1993).
245. 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993).
246. See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability For Fraud
on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. Rlv. 691. Arlen and
Carney illustrate that securities fraud has a tendency of occurring in "final period"
settings when management fears possible insolvency and job loss, and as a consequence
are willing to assume greater legal risks.
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actors are equally culpable if the fraud succeeds. 247 This concept is
derived from common law tort tenets as illustrated by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship
Co. 2 In that case, the court held directors jointly and severally liable
where they failed to fully and fairly disclose material facts in proxy
materials and declared:
Where two or more persons fail to perform a common duty each
is liable for the entire harm resulting from the breach .... As
joint tortfeasors they are jointly and severally liable for the plaintiffs'
entire damage which they have inflicted ... and this is true even
though one of the tortfeasors held liable has received no benefit
from his wrongdoing. 9
The Act restricts the imposition of joint and several liability to
persons who are either "primary wrongdoers" or who commit "knowing
securities fraud." A "primary wrongdoer" is defined as any "issuer,
registrant, purchaser, seller, . . . underwriter of securities, marketmaker
. . . specialist in securities, clearing agency, securities information
processor or government securities dealer if such person breached a
direct statutory or regulatory obligation .... ."250 "Knowing securities
fraud" can only be established if it is proven that a person "makes
a material representation with actual knowledge that, as a result of
the omission, one of the material representations is false" and "knows
that the other persons are likely to rely on that misrepresentation or
omission." 25' Consequently, the Act would codify a standard of
culpability for attorneys and accountants more strict than even the
Seventh Circuit's standard of recklessness. 21 2 An attorney's or
accountant's extreme deviation from the standard of care would not
247. See NASAA Testimony, supra note 6, at 6.
248. 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).
249. id. at 778; see W. PAGE KEHEiON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON ThE LAW
OF TORTS § 52, at 345 (5th ed. 1984).
250. See The Act, supra note 236. Section 203(a) of the Act would add a proposed
§ 41(b)(2) which would define "primary wrongdoer."
251. See The Act, supra note 236. Section 203(a) would amend the Exchange Act
by adding § 41. Proposed § 41(b)(2) defines "knowing securities fraud." Sections
41(b)(2)(A) and (B)(ii) contain provisions declaring that persons are either "primary
wrongdoers" or persons engaging in "knowing securities fraud" if they "intentionally
rendered substantial assistance to the fradulent conduct," "with knowledge [of the
conduct and] that such conduct was wrongful." These definitional sections presume
the validity of aider and abettor liability. Yet, the Act does not amend § 10(b) to
provide for such liability. This can be explained by the fact that the Act was introduced
on March 24, 1994, while the Court did not decide Central Bank until April 19,
1994.
252. See supra text accompanying note 149.
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suffice for the imposition of joint and several liability, but would
subject such person only to proportionate liability "linked to degree
of fault."251
The liability scheme proposed by the Act would shift the financial
exposure from attorneys and accountants to the investing public.
Competing arguments can be made for or against this shift in policy.
The National Association of Securities Administrators Association
(NASAA),2 joined by various groups, most notably the American
Association of Retired Persons, has argued, "If forced to choose
between innocent investors who are victimized in a scheme and
professionals who have knowingly or recklessly assisted the fraud by
failing to meet professional standards, the risk of financial loss rightfully
is borne by the professionals, and not the innocent victims."255 However,
Stuart J. Kaswell, the Senior Vice President and General Counsel of
the Securities Industry Association, expressed a differing view in
response to the Central Bank decision by stating, "[M]oreover,
secondary liability, coupled with the securities laws' application of
joint and several liability, could result in peripheral and incidental
actors unfairly bearing the entire liability for the intentional fraud
of others."' '
Regardless of the hierarchy one places on these competing policy
positions, the underlying rationale of imposing joint and several liability
on peripheral participants under Rule lOb-5, as mentioned earlier, has
been that the participant failed to reveal the existence of the fraud.
Therefore, a requirement that the participant actually knew of the
fraudulent scheme is entirely consistent with this rationale. Moreover,
a continuation of joint and several liability may make it difficult for
smaller and newer companies to attract and obtain competent legal
and accounting services. As the Court stated in Central Bank, "[a]
professional may fear that a newer or smaller company may not
survive and that business failure would generate securities litigation
against the professional, among others." ' 2 7
253. See Lavelle, supra note 231, at BI; see also The Act, supra note 236, § 203(d)
(proposing revisions to § 41(d) of the Exchange Act).
254. NASAA has described itself as "the national voice of the 50 state securities
agencies responsible for investor protection and the efficient functioning of the capital
markets at the grassroots level." See Background Brief of NASAA, "Key Flaws in
S. 1976, Proposed Securities Litigation Reform Bill," June 1994 (hereinafter Brief
of NASAA).
255. See Brief of NASAA, supra note 254, at 7.
256. See SIA Testimony, supra note 6, at 8. Kaswell states that the present securities
fraud class action system equates to a "litigation tax" on capital formation, which
"drains funds that would otherwise be available to produce new products, expand
plants, or hire more workers." SIA Testimony, supra note 6, at 6.
257. 114 S. Ct. at 1454. The National Venture Capital Association released a
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2. Statute of Limitations.
Because there is no express statute of limitations within section
10(b), courts traditionally borrowed the statute of limitations from
the most analogous state law. This limitation period was usually
borrowed from the state's blue sky law fraud action. 218 In Lampf,
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,25 9 the Supreme Court
rejected that practice and held that the statute of limitations applicable
to a private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 was
one year after discovery of the facts constituting the violation, but
within a maximum of three years after the violation occurred.2
The Act would extend the statute of limitations under section
10(b) to five years after the violation, but would impose a two-year
limitation from the point in time the violation was discovered "or
should have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable
diligence. ' ' 61
survey of 212 publicly traded companies in March 1994, where it was found that
more than one in six newer companies had been defendants in securities fraud suits.
As of March 9, 1994, the suits had generated an average of 1,055 hours of management
time each and $692,000 in legal fees. See Brent Bowers & Vdayan Gupta, Shareholder
Suits Beset More Small Companies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1994.
258. See, e.g., Bath v. Bushkin, Gains, Gains and Jonas, 913 F.2d 817 (10th Cir.
1990); Smith v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 891 F.2d 1567 (1lth Cir. 1990); Jensen v.
Snellings, 841 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1988); Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.
1985); Gurley v. Documentation Inc., 674 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1982); Carothers v.
Rice, 633 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981); Cook v. Avien,
Inc., 573 F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1978); Forrestal Village, Inc. v. Graham, 551 F.2d 411
(D.C. Cir. 1977); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 460 F.2d 362 (8th Cir. 1972). But see In
re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that §§ 9(e)
and 18(a) of the Exchange Act provide a closer analogy and adopted a statute of
limitations one year from discovery and in no event more than three years from the
violation of the statute), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988). In re Data Access was
followed by the Second Circuit in Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349 (2d
Cir. 1990), and the Seventh Circuit in Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d
1385 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 50i U.S. i250 (1991)).
259. 501 U.S. 350 (1991), reh'g denied, 501 U.S. 1277 (1991).
260. Id. at 364. However, on December 19, 1991, Congress amended the Exchange
Act by adding § 27A, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-l(a) (Supp. V 1993), which
limits the Lampf decision to proactive application by stating, "The limitation period
for any private civil action implied under § 10(b) or this Act that was commenced
on or before June 19, 1991 shall be the limitation period provided by the laws
applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed
on June 19, 1991."
261. See The Act, supra note 236. Subsection 102(b) of the Act would amend the
Exchange Act by adding § 37(a) which would create a new limitations period for
private litigation under § 10(b). Several courts have judicially adopted a reasonable
diligence or constructive notice standard regarding the tolling of the statute of
limitations. See Brumbaugh v. Princeton Partners, 985 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1993);
Corwin v. Marney, Orton Invs., 843 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
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As a matter of course, this constructive notice or reasonable
diligence standard will be asserted by attorneys defending Rule 10b-
5 cases. Instead of abrogating excessive and vexatious litigation, the
reasonable diligence standard is sure to initiate even more litigation.
The Supreme Court reiterated in Central Bank that litigation under
section 10(b) "demands certainty and predictability." 2 A "reasonable
diligence" standard would demand a highly fact-oriented disposition
and would exacerbate the costs of litigating section 10(b) claims.
Former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden expressed opposition to the
standard by saying, "A 'reasonable diligence' standard is unfair to
fraud victims because almost every defendant can allege that a plaintiff
'should have' discovered a fraud earlier. Thus, this requirement would
prompt a considerable amount of needless litigation to resolve subtle
shadings of what an investor could or might have done." 23
The issues that arise with a reasonable diligence standard are
potentially endless. Is the standard to be applied similarly to investors
regardless of experience, sophistication, intellect or, education? Will
courts develop differing standards for professionals? Will experts
emerge to testify when the professional investor should have discovered
the fraud? What qualifications must an expert possess? Will the courts
always be required to hold a separate hearing on the statute of
limitations? Seemingly, this trial within a trial, in the context most
likely of a summary judgment proceeding, would be necessary because
the defendant would be required to argue that fraud existed and that
the plaintiff should have discovered it. In an area that demands
certainty and predictability, the enactment of such an equivocal standard
is sure to create a morass of litigation which is neither desirable nor
in furtherance of the Act's purpose. Regardless of the time period
attributed to statute of limitations, a bright-line rule appears to be
more prudent.
3. Concept of "Financial Means-Testing"
Under existing law, the financial wealth of the plaintiff has no
relevance to securities fraud litigation under section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5. However, the Act departs from this tenet by applying the
concept of "financial means-testing" to determine whether a plaintiff
has standing under section 10(b) or to determine whether a plaintiff
is entitled to the imposition of joint and several liability.
924 (1988); Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
943 (1987); Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1979); Grahan
v. Taubman, 610 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1979).
262. 114 S. Ct. at 1454 (quoting Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 652 (1988)).
263. See Brief of NASAA, supra note 254, at 9.
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The Act would impose a means-testing scheme upon three key
areas. First, it would require that plaintiffs desiring to be certified
as representatives of a class must have aggregately owned, at the time
the action occurred, the lesser of $10,000 market value or one percent
of the securities in question.2 6 Second, the Act would create a system
directing cases to alternative dispute resolution (ADR). 20 Any party
to the case could object to ADR as the method of disposition or
object to the outcome of an ADR proceeding and litigate the case
in federal court.3 However, if a person objects on one of these
bases and the court renders a judgment against the person ruling that
the person's claim was not "substantially justified," the Act would
require the court to award attorneys fees and costs against that
person. 27 This shifting of fees and costs would always be applicable
to attorneys, but would apply to the named plaintiff only if that
plaintiff owned more than $1 million of the securities. 2" Third, the
Act would preserve joint and several liability only for those plaintiffs
who are natural persons with net worth of less than $200,000 and
who have incurred damages of more than 10% of their net worth. 
2
The system of means-testing proposed by the Act is a radical
deviation from existing law. The basis of the financial test regarding
standing is apparently to eliminate the so-called "professional plaintiff"
and to assure that class representatives protect the rights and interests
of investors rather than acquiesce to the unscrupulous tactics of some
plaintiffs' counsel. 270 Furthermore, the fee-shifting provision is
264. See The Act, supra note 236. Subsection 101(c) of the Act would amend §
21 of the Exchange Act by adding several new provisions, including § 21(o), which
would provide the standing requirements for class representatives. The requirement
for standing is similar to that required under 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 to place a
shareholder proposal on an issuer's proxy statement, except Rule 14a-8 requires only
$1,000 market value owned and contains other minimum holding period requirements.
265. See The Act, supra note 236. Subsection 102(a) of the Act would amend thexCh11an __ A t - " U .- AA: _ 36 ""5:4 .... U: c U w l ----- --. , _ ; .... e re..... ion;,
25r.I-L U, tluuflg b JU Mnlfli ua..cs.annna I" -..lJt
("ADR") procedure for securities litigation. Any party could offer to proceed to
ADR, which would be voluntary and nonbinding, within the time period for answering
the complaint, or in cases where a class has been certified, within 30 days after a
steering committee or guardian ad litem had been appointed by the Court.
266. See The Act, supra note 236, § 102(a).
267. See The Act, supra note 236, § 102(a).
268. See the Act, supra note 236. Presumably the fee shifting provision would
always be applicable to a named defendant.
269. See The Act, supra note 236. Section 203(a) would amend the Exchange Act
to add § 41(d), which provides that each defendant that has not committed knowing
securities fraud and is not a primary wrongdoer is liable only for the portion of
the judgment that corresponds to that defendant's degree of fault. However, if upon
motion made by the plaintiff's counsel not later than six inonths after the final
judgment is entered, the court determines that all or part of a defendant's share is
uncollectible, the remaining defendants are jointly and severally liable, but only to
those plaintiffs who met the financial means test.
270. See, e.g., Shields v. Smith, 1991 WL 319032, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (stating
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apparently aimed at reducing the caseload of an already over-burdened
federal court system by deterring unmeritorious claims with the threat
of fees and costs. However, the provision retaining joint and several
liability for small investors is presumably political in nature.
Regardless of the merit of the policy objectives advanced in
support of these provisions, the concept that justice would be based
on the financial standing of the plaintiff is an antithesis to fair-
minded thinking. Moreover, the fee-shifting provision may have a
chilling effect on the representation of fraud victims, since the provision
is always applicable to the plaintiff's counsel. More poignant, however,
is that the provision restricting the imposition of joint and several
liability for the benefit of only small investors is questionable on due
process and equal protection grounds and undoubtedly will spur
litigation challenging its constitutionalityY'
Furthermore, there are also practical concerns to consider if such
a standard is enacted. What happens if none of the investors meets
the standard to represent the class? Is the class action mechanism
unavailable? Must each plaintiff individually pursue the defendants?
This surely would deny access to many defrauded investors. What if
a class consists of several thousand investors, some entitled to the
imposition of joint and several liability and some not? Does this
invalidate the commonality requirement of the class?272 If not, are
the federal courts charged with the responsibility of sorting out who
is entitled to what recovery? Apparently, the drafters have exhibited
little foresight regarding the potential consequences of instituting the
proposed provisions.
4. Standards for Fraud Pleadings
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a
plaintiff to plead fraud with particularity, meaning that particular
that due to a "consistent pattern of purchasing a few shares in troubled companies
[and] plaintiff's involvement in over two dozen lawsuits ... the Court finds clear
evidence that plaintiff's purchasing stock in troubled companies to possibly pursue
litigation is a serious defense likely to become the focus of the litigation to the
detriment of the class").
271. The Supreme Court will uphold legislative actions which burden persons of
a class based on wealth or lack thereof under the equal protection or due process
guarantee if the actions have any rational relationship to a legitimate end of gov-
ernment. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Educ., 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
272. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Rule 23(a) provides:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
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fraudulent acts or statements must be attributed to a particular
defendant.27 3 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Wool v. Tandem
Computers, Inc. ,274 recognized an exception to this rule where the
alleged misstatement or omission can be attributed to a group. If the
members of the group are involved in the day-to-day management
of those parts of the corporation involved in the fraud the allegations
may be pleaded generally.2 75 The court declared, "In cases of corporate
fraud where the false or misleading information is conveyed in
prospectuses, registration statements, annual reports, press releases,
or other 'group published information,' it is reasonable to presume
that these are the collective actions of the officers.
' 2 76
The Act would impose much stricter pleading standards and would
directly overrule Rule 9(b) and the "group pleading doctrine. ' 277 In
order to state a cause of action, a plaintiff would have to set forth
specific facts explaining why the plaintiff believes that each defendant
acted with intent*278 Furthermore, a plaintiff who alleges the making
of a material misstatement or omission would be required to specify
each statement believed to be misleading, the facts upon which the
plaintiff's belief is based, and why the statement is misleading.
279
If adopted, the new pleading standards may prove to be significant
obstacles for plaintiffs who may not have the requisite information
until discovery has been initiated or concluded. This is especially true
with respect to information regarding the defendant's state of mind.3
This seemingly impracticable standard puts the cart before the horse
and will either force plaintiff's counsel to fill in the gaps where the
facts are not yet known, often in anticipation of amending the
complaint if facts previously pleaded are either fallacious or not
273. FED. R. Crv. P. 9(b). Rule 9(b) provides:
In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud
or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and
other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.
274. 818 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1987).
275. Id. at 1439.
276. Id. at 1440.
277. See Brief of NASAA, supra note 254, at 11-12. Section 104 would amend
the Exchange Act by adding § 39 which would set forth the pleading requirements
for implied private actions under § 10(b).
278. See The Act, supra note 236, § 104(a). Proposed § 39 of the Exchange Act
would require the plaintiff to plead that the defendant "acted with some level of
intent." This requirement is substantially inconsistent with the adoption of the reck-
lessness standard under § 10(b). If passed in its present form, § 39(a) may be fertile
ground from which to harvest an argument for the abrogation of the recklessness
standard.
279. See The Act, supra note 236, § 104(b).
280. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("[M]alice, intent, knowledge, and other condition
of mind of a person may be averred generally.").
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apposite to the claim, or to drop the case altogether fearing possible
sanctions under Rule 11.28 Admittedly, reducing or eliminating frivolous
claims under Rule 1Ob-5 is salutary, but to accomplish this by prohibiting
the meritorious claims of investors because the malefactors refuse to
disclose how the fraud was perpetuated is simply unjustifiable.
IV. CONCLUSION
Embodied within the Exchange Act is a careful balance between
the desire to provide whole compensation to damaged investors and
the facilitation of fair and efficient markets. This is evidenced by the
coordination of the remedies and defenses in the Exchange Act.
Nevertheless, over the last quarter of a century the Supreme Court
has clung to a strict statutory approach and restricted the scope of
liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. However, there has been
a certain ebb and flow to section 10(b) jurisprudence. Each time the
Supreme Court has handed down an opinion that limits the scope
of liability under section 10(b), the lower federal courts have adroitly
embraced an alternative theory that takes back the ground previously
lost. Consequently, the boundaries of the scope of liability under
section 10(b) have been capricious. This fact has given rise to criticism
by attorneys and accountants who are the primary targets of expanded
liability.
The Court's decision in Central Bank once again restricts the
outward expansion of liability under section 10(b) by repudiating aider
and abettor liability. However, the path toward expansion of primary
liability under the phrase "indirectly" is clear. Needless to say, the
extent of that expansion is not absolute, but considering the track
record of the lower federal courts the term "indirectly" will most
likely cover the vast majority of defendants (i.e., attorneys and ac-
countants) that were previously held liable under the aiding and
abetting theory.
After the Court's decision, many cried out for Congressional
repudiation. However, if Congress responds to Central Bank, it will
probably not come in piecemeal fashion, but rather in the context
of a broader bill. Passage of the bill presently under consideration
in the Senate Securities Subcommittee would constitute an unmitigated
reversal in policy, shifting financial risk of loss from professionals
who provide services in the securities business to the investing public.
281. See FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (imposing sanctions on attorneys who sign a pleading,
written motion, or "other paper" which has been filed for an improper purpose,
or is otherwise frivolous or unsupported by the evidence).
19941
94 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:45
The 73rd Congress enacted the Exchange Act with an overriding policy
objective to replace the doctrine of caveat emptor with one of full
disclosure. Although the proposed bill would leave untouched the
extensive body of law requiring full disclosure with respect to a
purchase or sale of securities, it would strip the Exchange Act of its
teeth to enforce those requirements.
